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A FAIR TRIAL: WHEN THE CONSTITUTION
REQUIRES ATTORNEYS TO INVESTIGATE
THEIR CLIENTS’ BRAINS
Ellen G. Koenig*
ABSTRACT
The U.S. Constitution guarantees every criminal defendant the
right to a fair trial. This fundamental right includes the right to a
defense counsel who provides effective assistance. To be effective,
attorneys must sometimes develop specific types of evidence in
crafting the best defense. In recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court
has found that defense attorneys did not provide effective assistance
when they failed to consider neuroscience. But when must defense
attorneys develop neuroscience in order to provide effective
assistance? This question is difficult because the standard for
determining effective assistance is still evolving. There are two
leading approaches. First, in Strickland v. Washington, the Court
adopted a two-prong “reasonableness” test, which, according to
Justice O’Conner, may result in court decisions that fail to properly
protect a criminal defendant’s rights. Recently, courts have adopted a
second approach based on guidelines promulgated by the American
Bar Association.
This Note aims to answer this question. It first provides a
background on the right to effective assistance of counsel and briefly
describes neuroscience evidence, oppositions to and limitations on in
its use, and its admissibility in court. Second, this Note attempts to
give some guidance to attorneys by exploring the American Bar
Association and U.S. Supreme Court standards. Third, it summarizes
the results of a statistical analysis conducted by the author, which
helps further define when courts require attorneys to develop
neuroscience evidence. It concludes by arguing that attorneys need
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guidance to ensure they are not violating the Sixth Amendment. This
Note expands on the American Bar Association’s standard and
suggests a framework attorneys may use to determine whether they
should develop neuroscience evidence to ensure that their client has a
fair trial.
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INTRODUCTION
David Perkins was brutally attacked by several men when he was
twenty years old.1 Although it is unclear what precipitated the attack,
the impact on Mr. Perkins was permanent.2 During the attack Mr.
Perkins’s attackers used a pronged rake to stab Mr. Perkin’s head,
which left a permanent hole in his skull and brain.3 Mr. Perkins also
had a car-accident related head injury two years earlier that left him
in a coma for five days and caused him to lose six months of memory.4
Taken together, these two head injuries left Mr. Perkins a man with a
hole in his skull, who occasionally blacked out, experienced blurry
vision, and suffered from short-term memory problems5—all physical
symptoms that neurologists say may indicate brain damage.
Physically, these head injuries left Mr. Perkins permanently
impaired, mentally, the effects haunted his daily life.6 After these
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

See Perkins v. Hall, 708 S.E.2d 335, 343 (Ga. 2011).
See id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 343–44.
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injuries, friends, family, and acquaintances noticed he was not the
same7––he suffered from, as the highest court in Georgia described,
“significant personality and cognitive changes.”8 He would drink
heavily, stare blankly into space, and suffer fits of unprovoked
violence that he failed to remember after.9 For example, he once
stabbed a couch with a knife and did not remember doing so
afterwards.10
Unfortunately, even before these head injuries Mr. Perkins’ life
was already filled with emotional, physical, and sexual abuse.11
Starting when he was three years old, his father beat and provided
him with drugs and alcohol.12 The degradation continued into
adulthood where his father would beat and urinate on him.13
Eventually, Mr. Perkins, who suffered from depression and was
haunted by perpetual flashbacks from the physical and sexual abuse,
tried to commit suicide by slitting his wrists with a razor blade.14
On Saturday, August 12, 1995, Mr. Perkins played guitar and drank
beer in his apartment with a neighbor.15 Around midnight, without
provocation,16 Mr. Perkins hit his neighbor with a guitar, brutally
stabbed him with a knife eleven times, and crushed a liquor bottle
At 5:00 a.m.––with bloodstains covering his
over his head.17
neighbor’s body––he called his wife, who was staying at her mother’s
house,18 and asked her to bring him over two cigarettes.19 After his
wife came to the apartment, which was covered in blood, she left to
call the police.20 Mr. Perkins then went to a different neighbor’s door
to ask for some cigarettes.21 Ultimately, Mr. Perkins was found guilty
of murder that was “outrageously and wantonly vile, horrible, and

7. See id.
8. Id. at 343.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id. at 342.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id. at 342–43
15. See Perkins v. State, 505 S.E.2d 16, 18 (Ga. 1998)
16. While Perkins claims his attack was in self-defense, see Hall, 708 S.E.2d at
339, he had no defensive wounds and the forensic evidence disproved the defense.
See Brief for Appellee at 5, Perkins v. State, 505 S.E.2d 16 (Ga. 1998) (No.
S98P0624), 1998 WL 34187305.
17. See Hall, 708 S.E.2d at 339.
18. See Perkins, 505 S.E.2d at 18.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id.
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inhuman in that it involved depravity of mind.”22 During his trial, he
“taunted the courtroom by making boxing gestures” at the jury.23
At trial, Mr. Perkin’s behavior was, as his appointed trial counsel
coined, “bizarre” to say the least because he did not want his counsel
to speak with his family or to investigate his childhood background––
he even fired one of his attorneys for asking a woman who visited him
in jail about his mental health.24 He was adamant that he was not
“crazy” and refused to be examined by any mental health experts.25
His defense team did make an unsuccessful motion to have him
committed to a psychiatric hospital to be observed and made a
motion to have him found incompetent to stand trial, which they later
withdrew.26
Fifteen years later, the Georgia Supreme Court found that Mr.
Perkins’ Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was
violated when a jury sentenced him to death because his counsel did
not investigate his brain injury.27 In particular, these attorneys (1)
limited their investigation of his background to just interviewing his
ex-wife and mother and (2) did not review his medical records.28 The
vast majority of ineffective assistance of counsel claims are
unsuccessful because of the strong presumption that attorneys
effectively represent their clients.29 But in Mr. Perkins’s case, the
court found he had a right to have neuroscience evidence––evidence

22. See id. at 17.
23. Profiles of Inmates on Georgia’s Death Row, AUGUSTA CHRONICLE, Sept. 22,
1997, http://chronicle.augusta.com/stories/1997/09/22/met_214998.shtml.
24. See id. at 340–41; Brief for Respondent at 19, Perkins v. Hall, 708 S.E.2d 335
(2011) (No. S10A1754), 2010 WL 4955480 (“Appellant informed trial counsel that ‘he
did not want them speaking with his family’ and he did not want trial counsel to ‘go
into a great deal of his childhood background,’ and if trial counsel tried to discuss
these issues despite Appellant’s position, Appellant would get confrontational.”).
25. See Hall, 708 S.E.2d at 344. Perkins said he did not want to meet with the
mental health experts because the mental health expert would want to interview
someone, such as his wife, who would lie about him. See id.
26. See id. at 344, 347.
27. See id. at 344.
28. First, their background investigation consisted only of interviewing Mr.
Perkins’s mother and ex-wife. See generally Brief for Respondent, Hall, 708 S.E.2d
335 (No. S10A1754). They also interviewed some jail inmates who could testify to his
mental health. See id. at 20. Perkins’s mother led the defense attorneys to believe
that no one else in the family would be willing to participate in Mr. Perkins’s defense
and the attorneys took this assertion at face value. See id. Second, they also failed to
acquire the medical records from the rake attack––records that the habeas attorneys
had no problem acquiring––which would have demonstrated how the rake literally
penetrated Mr. Perkins. See Hall, 708 S.E.2d at 340, 343.
29. See infra Part II.B.
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of his brain injury––developed by defense counsel.30 This Note aims
to better explain why in this case and others like it, the Sixth
Amendment quite simply requires counsel to develop neuroscience
evidence regardless of the defendant’s wishes.31
This Note is one of the first pieces of scholarly research exclusively
dedicated to understanding when the Sixth Amendment requires
attorneys to use neuroscience evidence.32 Scholarship on this topic is
long overdue as courts across the nation––from the U.S. Supreme
Court down to local county courts—find the Sixth Amendment may
require counsel to develop neuroscience evidence when preparing
their cases.33
Neuroscience is highly technical and sometimes controversial. As a
result, attorneys may not intuitively know that the Sixth Amendment
requires them to develop this evidence. Yet in recent times,
uncovering what is contained in the human brain has become not only
a mission for doctors, academics, and scholars, but also a central
mission of the federal government.34 As neuroscience inevitably
advances, the connection or lack thereof, between the human brain
and crime may become better known. Consequently, neuroscience
may find its way ever more into our nation’s criminal courtrooms.35

30. See Hall, 708 S.E.2d at 344.
31. See id.
32. Based on preemption searches conducted on Bloomberg, WestlawClassic,
WestlawNext, and LexisNexis search databases. Search terms included the following
in various forms: effective assist!, ineffective assist!, Sixth Amendment, Strickland,
neuro!, brain, fMRI, functional magnetic resonance imaging, MRI, magnetic
resonance imaging, PET scan, position emission tomography, CAT scan, computer
axonal tomography, CT scan, EEG, electroencephalogram, SPECT, single-photon
emission computed tomography, MRA, BEAN, brain fingerprinting, assistance.
33. See Appendix for sample.
34. In 2013 President Barack Obama, while pledging 100 million dollars towards a
“BRAIN” project, explained how one of the federal government’s central missions is
to study the brain at a level more refined than ever before. See B.R.A.I.N. Initiative,
WHITE HOUSE (April 2, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/infographics/braininitiative. The Royal Society of London has also voiced support for continued study
and exploration of neuroscience and law. See ROYAL SOC’Y OF LONDON, BRAIN
WAIVES MODULE 4: NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW, (2011), available at
http://royalsociety.org/uploadedFiles/Royal_Society_Content/policy/projects/brainwaves/Brain-Waves-4.pdf.
35. For a general overview and analysis of neuroscience’s use in courts, see Susan
A. Bandes, The Promise and Pitfalls of Neuroscience for Criminal Law and
Procedure, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 119, 120 (2010) and John H. Blume & Emily C.
Paavola, Life, Death, and Neuroimaging: The Advantages and Disadvantages of the
Defense’s Use of Neuroimages in Capital Cases—Lessons from the Front, 62
MERCER L. REV. 909, 931 (2011).
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The U.S. Supreme Court and the American Bar Association
(ABA) have created some standards attorneys can follow to
determine if their performance is in line with the Sixth Amendment’s
right to effective assistance of counsel.36
Unfortunately for
neuroscience evidence, these standards are vague and may be difficult
to practically apply.
To search for a standard that can be practically applied, the author
did a comprehensive case search to attempt to locate all criminal
cases in the last twenty years where courts found attorneys violated
the Sixth Amendment for not developing neuroscience evidence.37
The author then analyzed the over nine hundred cases that resulted
from the search. The final case sample consists of seventy-four lower
court decisions and five U.S. Supreme Court decisions.38 These cases
serve both as a source of authority for this Note and as a resource
attorneys can use to help them determine when they must develop
neuroscience evidence.
Mr. Perkins’ story is illustrative of many cases where courts have
found the Sixth Amendment requires attorneys to develop
neuroscience evidence.39 In his habeas petition, Mr. Perkins made the
following three ineffective assistance of counsel claims: (1) that he
was not competent to stand trial, (2) that his attorneys violated his
36. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695 (1984) (listing the first and
only framework the U.S. Supreme Court has iterated for analyzing ineffective
assistance of counsel claims); Criminal Justice Section Archive, AM. BAR ASSOC.,
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/criminal_justice_section_archive.html (last
visited Oct. 21, 2013) (listing the different Guidelines the American Bar Association’s
Criminal Justice Section promulgates).
37. See Appendix for case sample, although the search undoubtedly does not
encompass all such cases.
38. The author used the electronic legal search database, WestlawNext, to search
for all criminal cases since April 1, 1992 where courts found attorneys ineffective for
not developing neuroscience evidence. The initial case search returned 983 cases.
The author then read through each case to make sure they belonged in the sample.
Most of the cases were eliminated because they were either not on point, found the
attorney effective (instead of ineffective), or found the attorney ineffective for a
reason unrelated to neuroscience. After initial analysis, seventy-four cases remained.
As of March 25, 2013, the author could not find any key cite, head note, ALR or
similar secondary source on either LexisNexis or WestlawNext that collected cases
where a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights were violated because his
attorney failed to develop neuroscience evidence. Consequently, this case sample
(contained in Appendix) appears to be one of the first on this topic and should give
some aid to attorneys seeking to comply with the Sixth Amendment. Given that
there are so many courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, that have found and
continue to find the Sixth Amendment sometimes requires neuroscience evidence,
this case law analysis is both necessary and overdue.
39. See infra Part III.B for an in-depth analysis of how Perkins is similar to other
ineffective assistance of counsel cases.
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rights during the guilt phase, and (3) that his attorneys violated his
rights during the sentencing phase of trial by not developing evidence
regarding his brain injury even though they knew about the rake
attack, which severally injured his brain.40
Like most ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the court
rejected Mr. Perkins’ first claim for a procedural reason––he did not
raise it on direct appeal. Further, the court did not consider Mr.
Perkins’ second claim asserting his trial attorneys were ineffective
during the guilt phase of trial. As in many similar cases, it was only
the third claim—that trial counsel was ineffective during the
sentencing phase for not investigating his brain injury—that
prevailed.
Like the court in Hall, courts are more likely to find that the Sixth
Amendment requires counsel to offer neuroscience evidence during
the sentencing phase, rather than in the guilt phase.41 The guilt phase
of a trial occurs when the jury determines if a criminal defendant
committed the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt.42 If a
defendant is found guilty, the sentencing phase affords the jury the
ability to determine what the punishment will be.43 This may be
because the Federal Rules of Evidence strictly govern what evidence
can be admitted during the guilt phase at trial so neuroscience
evidence may not be admissible at all.44 In contrast, the sentencing
phase uses a “more is better” approach, and would prefer to let the
jury see all reasonable available mitigating evidence––that is, any
evidence that may help them conclude his act was less wrongful or
evil.45 For example, instances of prior abuse, the defendant’s mental
health, or prior brain injury may be mitigating evidence.46
An important caveat is that just because the Sixth Amendment
requires neuroscience evidence to be developed does not mean that it
must be used—or is even admissible—at trial.47 The purpose of
developing this evidence is to inform counsel of possible defenses,

40. See Perkins v. Hall, 708 S.E.2d 335, 339 & n.2, 344. (Ga. 2011).
41. See infra Part III.B.
42. See generally Gary Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 299, 330–31 (1983).
43. See id. at 334–35.
44. See Mark Pettit, Jr., FMRI and BF Meet FRE: Brain Imaging and the Federal
Rules of Evidence, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 319, 323–27 (2007).
45. See id.
46. See Sixth Amendment—Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 121 HARV. L. REV.
255, 264 (2007).
47. See infra Part I.B.
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even if they choose not to pursue them.48 The scope of what the Sixth
Amendment requires will be explored in Part II.
This Note is organized in four interrelated parts. Part I provides a
background on the Sixth Amendment’s right to effective assistance of
counsel. It briefly describes neuroscience, oppositions to and
limitations on in its use, and its admissibility in Court. To guide
attorneys, Part II provides an overview of the standards the ABA and
U.S. Supreme Court have developed to explain when attorneys must
develop neuroscience to be effective. Part III explains the results of a
statistical analysis conducted by the author, which helps further
define when courts already require attorneys to develop neuroscience
evidence. Finally, Part IV explains why attorneys need guidance to
ensure that they are not violating the Sixth Amendment, and expands
on the ABA Guidelines by proposing a framework attorneys may use
to determine whether or not they should develop neuroscience
evidence.
I. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT, EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE, AND
NEUROSCIENCE: A PRELIMINARY FRAMEWORK FOR
UNDERSTANDING COUNSEL’S O BLIGATIONS
This Part first describes the Sixth Amendment and how courts
determine if counsel provided their client effective assistance. It then
explains what neuroscience is and how it may be presented as
evidence in a criminal trial.
A. The Sixth Amendment’s Right to (Effective) Assistance of
Counsel
The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees every
criminal defendant the right to effective assistance of counsel49 for
two reasons: first, because every criminal defendant has a
fundamental right to a fair trial,50 and second, because our criminal

48. See ABA, American Bar Association Guidelines for the Appointment and
Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, reprinted in 31 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 913, 1017–18 (2003).
49. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) (“[T]he right to
counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.”).
50. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684 (1984). See also Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); and Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) for the line of cases that developed this right. The
Court originally iterated the right to effective assistance in Powell. 287 U.S. 45, 63.
Because the Sixth Amendment had not been incorporated to the states at that time,
this right was based on the Due Process Clause. See id. at 63. This right is now
understood as a Sixth Amendment right. See John H. Blume & Stacey D. Neumann,
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justice system believes a fair trial occurs only if two opposing sides
forcefully argue against each other.51 If the defense counsel does not
argue effectively, a resulting conviction may be unjust and is not
reliable.52
However, courts disagree on what is or is not effective assistance,
raising two questions: (1) is it better to promote independent counsel
that are free to zealously defend their clients, or (2) should counsel
have more guidance to ensure that counsel meets at least a minimal
standard of effectiveness? From these questions, two answers
emerge: the standard articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Strickland, which asks that counsel merely be “reasonable,” and the
ABA Guidelines, which further instruct attorneys of specific
obligations.
1.

The U.S. Supreme Court’s Delineated Framework: Strickland v.
Washington

In 1984, Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion in Strickland v.
Washington was the first and only time the U.S. Supreme Court
articulated a specific standard courts must follow to determine if an
attorney provided effective assistance under the Sixth Amendment.53
A Florida judge sentenced Charles Strickland to death for a series of
three separate brutal murders and stabbings.54 Mr. Strickland’s
counsel neither presented any character witnesses at sentencing, nor
did he request a psychiatric examination or meet with any of Mr.
Strickland’s family to develop mitigating evidence.55 Defense counsel
decided not to investigate these areas due to “reasonable professional
judgment”––because a prior psychiatric report had not revealed any

“It’s Like Deja Vu All Over Again”: Williams v. Taylor, Wiggins v. Smith, Rompilla
v. Beard and a (Partial) Return to the Guidelines Approach to the Effective
Assistance of Counsel, 34 AM. J. CRIM. L. 127, 131 (2007) (citing United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 223–38 (1967)).
51. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685 (explaining how our system of criminal justice
relies on an adversarial system).
52. See id. (citing Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 275, 276
(1942)) (noting that effective defense counsel is fundamental to our adversarial
system because “access to counsel’s skill and knowledge is necessary to accord
defendants the ‘ample opportunity to meet the case of the prosecution’ to which they
are entitled”).
53. Id. at 683 (“[T]he Court has never directly and fully addressed a claim of
‘actual ineffectiveness’ of counsel’s assistance in a case going to trial.”).
54. See id. at 671 (detailing the charged murders); Washington v. State, 362 So. 2d
658 (Fla. 1978).
55. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 673.
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“major mental illness.”56 Instead of pursuing a mental health defense,
counsel decided to focus on extreme emotional disturbance and
Strickland’s willingness to take responsibility for the crime.57 The
Court found counsel was effective because their performance was
“reasonabl[e] under prevailing professional norms” and even if,
arguendo, there was an error, Mr. Strickland was not prejudiced by
it.58
To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, Strickland requires a
criminal defendant to prove two things: (1) that his counsel’s
performance was deficient, and (2) that he was prejudiced by this
deficiency.59 If both elements are met, the criminal defendant’s Sixth
Amendment rights were violated and he is entitled to either an
entirely new trial or a new sentencing depending on where the
deficiency occurred.60

a.

Deficient Performance

An attorney’s performance is deficient if, based on what they knew
or should have known at the time,61 their acts were not reasonable
“under prevailing professional norms.”62 At a minimum, attorneys
must investigate the case so they can make “informed choice[s]
among possible defenses.”63 While this duty to investigate “is limited
to a reasonable investigation,”64 it does require investigating the

56. Id. at 699, 676.
57. Id. at 673–74.
58. Id. at 699.
59. Id. at 687. A court may determine there was not prejudice without first
examining if the attorney’s performance was deficient. Id. at 697.
60. Id. at 687. This standard makes proving ineffective assistance—in any
circumstance—a high bar to reach. For example, the court in Berry v. King found no
ineffective assistance of counsel, even if counsel used drugs during trial because
“under Strickland the fact that an attorney used drugs is not, in and of itself, relevant
to an ineffective assistance claim.” 765 F.2d 451, 454 (5th Cir. 1985).
61. See Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223, 1226 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Effectiveness
must be judged as of the time the legal services were rendered so as to minimize the
distortions of hindsight.”).
62. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688; see also Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 511 (2003).
63. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 511 (2003); see also Ard v. Catoe, 642 S.E.2d 590, 597
(S.C. 2007) (“[W]ithout a doubt . . . ‘[a] defense attorney has a duty to investigate.’”
(quoting Thompson v. Wainwright, 787 F.2d 1447, 1450 (11th Cir. 1986))); accord
Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 37 (2009). See generally ABA, ABA STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION (3d ed.
1993), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/
criminal_justice_standards/prosecution_defense_function.authcheckdam.pdf.
64. See Thompson, 787 F.2d at 1450 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691); Ard, 642
S.E.2d at 597 (quoting Thompson, 787 F.2d at 1450).
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client’s background65––specifically in capital cases where
“professional norms require counsel to conduct a thorough
investigation into ‘all reasonably available mitigating evidence’”66––
and may sometimes require expert consultations.67
However, the Strickland Court was concerned that a set standard
of rules that attorney’s must follow in all cases could interfere with an
attorney’s constitutionally protected independence.68
Thus, a
reasonable investigation does not “require counsel to investigate
every conceivable line of mitigating evidence.”69 Counsel can even
decide not to investigate certain options if it results from a strategic
choice––that is, an informed, reasoned decision that is supported by
“reasonable professional judgment.”70 For instance, as discussed in
Strickland, it was permissible for counsel to decide to stop
investigating Mr. Strickland’s mental health because a prior
psychiatric report did not reveal any “major mental illness”—a
decision that was informed and supported by “reasonable
professional judgment.”71
In Justice O’Connor’s words, “counsel has a duty to make
reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that
makes particular investigations unnecessary.”72
As courts are
extremely deferential to counsel’s strategic decisions, an
unreasonable investigation is only found in extremely egregious
circumstances.73 Unfortunately, in neuroscience cases, the U.S.
Supreme Court has encountered an increasing number of such
egregious cases, as explored in Part II.

65. See Elmore v. Ozmint, 661 F.3d 783, 857 (4th Cir. 2011) (citing Strickland, 466
U.S. at 691).
66. Post-Hearing Brief at 24, Stone v. South Carolina, 655 S.E.2d 487 (S.C. 2007)
(No. 08-CP-43-905) (citing Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524).
67. See Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 788 (2011).
68. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
69. See Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 533; see also Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 383
(2005) (“[T]he duty to investigate does not force defense lawyers to scour the globe
on the off chance something will turn up; reasonably diligent counsel may draw a line
when they have good reason to think further investigation would be a waste.”).
70. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. However, counsel cannot justify an
incomplete investigation for fear that it would not reveal mitigating information or
because the client does not want counsel to collect mitigating evidence. See Hamblin
v. Mitchell, 354 F.3d 482, 492 (6th Cir. 2003).
71. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 676.
72. See id. at 691.
73. See supra note 62 for an illustrative example.
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Actual Prejudice

The client must also be prejudiced by counsel’s deficient
Prejudice occurs when there is “substantial
performance.74
likelihood” that the defendant’s trial’s result would have been
different but for the counsel’s unprofessional act.75 For many
proceedings, it is enough to show that “at least one juror would have
struck a different balance.”76 In capital cases the court must weigh
aggravating factors (factors that make a crime more wrong) with the
“totality of available mitigating evidence” (factors that make a crime
less wrong).77 Because prejudice is rarely proven, counsel’s deficient
performance is often merely regarded as a harmless error.78

2.

The ABA’s Guidelines: Expanding on Strickland to Further
Explain Sixth Amendment Requirements

Justice Marshall explained in his Strickland dissent that “[t]o
tell lawyers and the lower courts that counsel for a criminal defendant
must behave ‘reasonably’ and must act like ‘a reasonably competent
attorney’ is to tell them almost nothing.”79 To give clearer guidance
to counsel and to create uniformity in lower courts,80 the ABA

74. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; see also Sears v. Upton, 130 S. Ct. 3259, 3264
(2010); United States v. Kurti, 427 F.3d 159, 163 (2d Cir. 2005); State v. Salazar, 707
P.2d 944 (Ariz. 1985); accord Hooks v. Workman, 689 F.3d 1148, 1185 (10th Cir.
2012); Blystone v. Horn, 664 F.3d 397 (3rd Cir. 2011); Wilson v. Sirmons, 536 F.3d
1064, 1083 (10th Cir. 2008); Caro v. Woodford, 280 F.3d 1247, 1258 (9th Cir. 2002)
(all finding the client was actually prejudiced by their defense counsel’s deficient
performance).
75. See Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 38–39 (2009) (quoting Strickland, 466
U.S. at 694) (finding prejudice if there is a “reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.”) (emphasis added); accord Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012); Cullen
v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011). This likelihood must be substantial, not just
conceivable, see Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 792 (2011), and cannot assume
a fact finder would have disregarded the law, see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695.
76. See Porter, 558 U.S. at 41; Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 537 (2003); Von
Dohlen v. State, 602 S.E.2d 738, 743 (S.C. 2004).
77. See Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534.
78. See supra note 60 for an illustrative example. For an analysis of the Strickland
Standard to better understand why so many ineffective assistance of counsel claims
do not succeed, see Blume & Neumann, supra note 49, at 129.
79. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 707–08 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
80. For example, Guideline § 1.1(A) states, “The objective of these Guidelines is
to set forth a national standard of practice for the defense of capital cases in order to
ensure high quality legal representation for all persons facing the possible imposition
or execution of a death sentence by any jurisdiction.” ABA, supra note 48, at 919.
These Guidelines were also made in response to a number of statistical studies
regarding defense representation conducted by the federal government. See, e.g.,
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promulgated a set of Guidelines (ABA Guidelines) that list specific
obligations lawyers owe to their clients.81 The ABA Guidelines cover
many topics and include instructions for defense attorneys in many
different situations and cases.82 Part II when, according to the
Guidelines, the Sixth Amendment requires counsel to develop
neuroscience evidence. The Next Part explains what neuroscience is
for the purposes of this Note.
B.

What Is Neuroscience?

For purposes of this Note, neuroscience refers to the science of
“how the brain enables mental activity.”83 While neuroscience has
existed in its present form since roughly the 1950s, historians and
scholars have viewed the human brain as the center of intellect and
decision-making,84 and have studied the nexus between the human
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NATIONAL CRIMINAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS STUDY
(1986) available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/94702NCJRS.pdf;
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, CRIMINAL DEFENSE FOR THE POOR, 1986
(1988); NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL ASSESSMENT PROGRAM: FINAL SURVEY
RESULTS FOR PUBLIC DEFENDERS (1990).
81. See, e.g., United States v. Martin, 475 F.2d 943, 954–56 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(asserting the standard for effective assistance should follow the ABA Guidelines).
See generally ABA, supra note 63. For example, counsel has a duty to “conduct
appropriate investigations, both factual and legal, to determine what matters of
defense can be developed.” United States v. Decoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1204 (D.C. Cir.
1973). As then-Chief Judge Bazelon of the D.C. Circuit articulated, ABA Guidelines
are merely “a starting point for the court to develop, on a case by case basis, clearer
guidelines for courts and for lawyers as to the meaning of effective assistance.” Id. at
1203 n.23. Judge Bazelon’s view was that ineffective assistance of counsel would
follow a guideline approach, such as that articulated in the ABA Guidelines. See id.
at 1203, aff’d on reh’g en banc, 624 F.2d 196 (D.C. Cir. 1976); see also United States
v. Decoster (Decoster III), 624 F.2d 196, 276 (Bazelon, J., dissenting), cited in Blume
& Neumann, supra note 50, at 133.
82. See, e.g., ABA, supra note 63; ABA, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE (3d ed. 1992); ABA House of Delegates Resolution
8C (adopted Feb. 5, 2002).
83. See MARK GRAVES, MIND, BRAIN AND THE ELUSIVE SOUL 18 (2008).
Neuroscience is broader than this definition allowed and would include “all sciences
studying the nervous system and brain.” Id. Technically, this paper is concerned
merely with cognitive neuroscience. Id.
84. Alcmaen, born in 535 B.C.E., is thought to be the first to realize intellect was
located in the brain, an idea that was then developed by Hippocrates, the father of
modern medicine, Galen, and then Descartes. See 13 LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE:
CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 1 (Michael Freeman ed., 2011) [hereinafter LAW AND
NEUROSCIENCE].
Throughout history, there has been a struggle between
“materialist” views of human behavior and immaterial views. See Amanda C.
Pustilnik, Violence on the Brain: A Critique of Neuroscience in Criminal Law, 44
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 183, 190 (2009). Trying to find the source of criminality
within the material human brain represents a new acceptance of a materialist view.

See id.
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brain and crime for over two hundred years.85 In the twenty-first
century, uncovering what is contained in the human brain has become
not only a mission for doctors, academics, and scholars, but also a
central mission of the federal government.86 Thus, as neuroscience
advances, the connection, or lack thereof, between the human brain
and crime may become more known, and, consequently,
neuroscience’s presence in our nation’s criminal courtrooms may
become ubiquitous.

1.

Neuroscience Evidence Is Currently Used in Criminal Courts

As of today, rightly or wrongly, neuroscience is already used in the
criminal justice system and courts have found it probative in many
areas of criminal law.87 The court in State v. Appacrombie, for
instance, allowed the defense to introduce an electroencephalogram,
neuropsychological evaluation, and testimony by neurologist into
evidence.88 This evidence helped show that the defendant was unable
to appreciate the consequences of her crime when she shot at two
teenagers, killing one.89 The evidence revealed how, prior to the
crime, the defendant underwent a surgery to remove part of the
temporal lobe of her brain to help her with a seizure disorder,90 and
that after the surgery she became more violent, angry, and paranoid
without provocation.91
In some instances, like in Appacrombie, neuroscience may tell us
how or why someone may have acted in a given situation.92 For

85. See Pustilnik, supra note 84, at 191. (“[T]heories of the causes of violence and
of ways to identify and deal with people who may be prone to violence historically
have exerted tremendous pull over many criminal law scholars and practitioners.”).
Today we are back in a time where human thoughts and behaviors are localized in a
material place. See id.
86. See supra Part I.
87. See Blume & Paavola, supra note 35, at 910 (citing Margaret Talbot, Duped:
Can Brain Scans Uncover Lies?, NEW YORKER, July 2, 2007, at 52); Jonathan H.
Marks, Interrogational Neuroimaging in Counterterrorism: A “No Brainer” or a
Human Rights Hazard?, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 483 (2007) (discussing neuroscience and
terrorism); Jennifer Wild, Brain Imaging Ready to Detect Terrorist, Say
Neuroscientists, 437 NATURE 457, 457 (2005) (same)).
88. State v. Appacrombie, 766 So. 2d 771, 776 (La. Ct. App. 2000). For a detailed
description of EEGs and their current use in the criminal justice system, see infra
note 124 and accompanying text.
89. See Appacrombie, 766 So. 2d at 766.
90. See id. at 774.
91. See id. (noting how she became paranoid by, for example, believing her family
was doing “voodoo” against her).
92. See Adam Lamparello, Using Cognitive Neuroscience to Predict Future
Dangerousness, 42 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 481, 495–96 (2011). There are many
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example, in Evans v. Secretary of the Department of Corrections, the
defendant shot and killed his brother’s girlfriend because she was
unfaithful.93 The Eleventh Circuit held that testimony by three
experts should have been admitted during the sentencing phase of
trial to testify about the defendant’s brain damage.94 The court
reasoned this damage caused him to act impulsively, limited his ability
to “appreciate the criminality of his conduct,” and would help explain
why he killed her so impulsively.95
Neuroscience may also reveal if a defendant was able to form the
requisite premeditation or other mental state the government must
prove as part of the charged crime.96 In Bean v. Calderon the
defendant asserted, and the Ninth Circuit agreed, that the defendant’s
brain damage and drug use together prevented him from being able
to form the requisite intent to kill necessary to support a first-degree
murder charge.97 Further, in Smith v. Dretke, an expert submitted an
affidavit stating the defendant likely suffered from organic brain
damage, which prevented him from understanding the difference
between right and wrong.98 In agreement, the Eleventh Circuit issued
a certificate of appealability.99
Neuroscience evidence has been used at every stage of legal
proceedings, including pre-trial competency, suppression hearings,
culpability, and sentencing.100 It can also be used for direct appeals

other ways neuroscience evidence may assist a criminal defense. For example,
neuroscience has already been used in courts in order to downgrade the level of
crime the defendant is charged with, to show the crime was not a voluntary act, to
argue the defendant is not competent to stand trial, and by the prosecution to show
the victim’s injuries. See generally Deborah W. Denno, Book Synopsis: Changing
Law’s Mind: How Neuroscience Can Help Us Punish Criminals More Fairly and
Effectively
(Aug.
15,
2011),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1909958##. Neuroscience evidence may also show a client
lacks impulse control, has a mental disease or defect, or has general cognitive defects.

See generally id.
93. Evans v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 681 F.3d 1241, 1244 (11th Cir. 2012) reh’g en
banc granted, opinion vacated, 686 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2012) and on reh’g en banc,
703 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2742 (2013).
94. Id. at 1270 (11th Cir. 2012).
95. Id. at 1247.
96. See O. Carter Snead, Neuroimaging and the “Complexity” of Capital
Punishment, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1265, 1292 (2007).
97. Bean v. Calderon, 163 F.3d 1073, 1081 (9th Cir. 1998) (explaining how the
defendant claims his “mental impairments, coupled with his habitual use of PCP,
incapacitated him from forming the requisite intent for the crimes with which he was
charged”).
98. Smith v. Dretke, 422 F.3d 269, 283 n.5 (5th Cir. 2005).
99. Id. at 289.
100. See Appendix.
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and in support of habeas petitions and can, in theory, be introduced
by any party.101

2.

Opposition: What Is Special About Scientific Evidence?

Some opponents argue that neuroscience evidence should not be
used because it could not bear on any material fact in a criminal
case.102 Some assert that neuroscience cannot be probative because, it
is difficult to connect man-made crime with biology103 and that,
because humans have free will, their biology does not influence their
behavior.104 Further, some opponents assert neuroscience evidence
may not be reliable because it sometimes depends on information the
defendant—who is likely biased—reports about himself.105 This Note
does not seek to disprove these valid points. Rather, it seeks to
explain how the Sixth Amendment already requires attorneys to use
neuroscience evidence and to give guidelines on how to meet
constitutional requirements. These criticisms are not dispositive,
however, because they also apply to many other types of already
admissible evidence. Further they are aimed at more than simply
neuroscience––scientific evidence in general is often subject to
criticism by opponents who either doubt its probative value or fear
the evidence’s impact may lead to injustice. While unreliable,
misleading science exists, so does unreliable witness testimony and
identification techniques. Other evidence can supposedly be made

101. Although this Note is not concerned with neuroscience evidence used by the
prosecution, as it would not give rise to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, this
Note takes the stance that this evidence will be exclusively used by defense attorneys
because the rules of evidence would bar any use by the prosecution, see Fed. R. Evid.
403–04. Except, of course, if the prosecution were introducing a brain scan to show
the complainant’s injuries, see id.
102. See Sarah Ryan, Can Neuroscience Enhance Justice?, YALE L. SCH. LILLIAN
GOLDMAN L. LIBR. (Mar. 11, 2013), http://library.law.yale.edu/news/can-neuroscience
-enhance-justice.
103. See id. (“Culturally constructed crimes cannot be mapped onto neural
substrates.”).
104. See Theodore Y. Blumoff, How (Some) Criminals are Made, in LAW AND
NEUROSCIENCE, supra note 84, at 171, 184–89 (arguing that neuroscience can
influence a criminal’s act without undermining free will, while providing a general
overview of the philosophical arguments against this notion); see also Walter
Glannon, What Neuroscience Can (and Cannot) Tell Us about Criminal
Responsibility, in LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE, supra note 84, at 13, 17–18.
105. Commentators warn that these reports should not be used because the client,
facing possible criminal penalties, has a motive to mislead. See Marc J. Tasse,

Adaptive Behavior Assessment and the Diagnosis of Mental Retardation in Capital
Cases, 16 APPLIED NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 114, 119 (2009) (“Relying solely on the
individual’s self-report is fraught with problems.”).
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more truthful through techniques like cross-examination, so the
question arises: why should science be treated differently? Scientific
evidence’s unique criticism may simply be a reaction to historical
realities.
Today, scientific knowledge is tested, peer-reviewed, and
safeguarded. However, like law, scientific standards are a product of
history and policy. For much of human history, science was limited to
2000-year-old untested, non-replicated ideas that, at their inception,
were no more than hunches.106 The few privileged people who
possessed scientific knowledge had an unwarranted ability to
persuade and a history of abuse.107 For much of history, modern ideas
of scientific ethics and even science as a separate discipline did not
exist.108 Many empirical standards––like verification, experiments by
systematic observation, and result replication––were not adopted as
worldwide standards until at least the 1920s.109 Given science’s
history, philosophers and common law courts may have been wise to
limit its legal use.
Today, however, we are dealing with a much different world. Most
neuroscience—and certainly any science that the Federal Rules of
Evidence and its state counterparts will allow into court—derives
from studies of direct observation, reviewable results, replication, and
peer-review. Thus, many historical justifications for barring science
from the courtroom may not be applicable today. These historical
justifications do serve as reminders that courts should be ever vigilant
to make sure the science they admit is trustworthy (as with all types of
evidence).
C.

What Exactly Is “Neuroscience Evidence”?

“Neuroscience evidence” comes in many forms, but generally falls
in two broad categories: first, computer images of a human’s brain,

106. For example, fifth century philosopher Leucippus’s conception of the atom,
based solely on his personal reasoning, was relied on in building more scientific
theories even though it was not based on observational experiment or verified by a
microscope.
107. PAOLO ROSSI, FRANCIS BACON: FROM MAGIC TO SCIENCE 32 (2013).
108. Until the nineteenth century, scientific numeral arts were indistinguishable
from social liberal arts. Even when they divided, many scientific disciplines were not
considered distinct, requiring many scientists to be generalist. Without distinct
disciplines, it becomes very hard to develop the standards of reliability and validity
necessary to differentiate the well-founded from the folly.
109. Many of these ideas had not entered into scientific discourse at all until the
1920s to 1940s with the Logical Positivism movement promulgated by the Vienna
Circle.
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called brain scans; and second, tests that a mental health professional
gives a person to determine how their brain works, called
neuroscience evaluations.110 Experts who rely on neuroscience
evidence to form their expert opinions may bring this evidence with
them while testifying in a criminal case.111 When an expert testifies,
they may show the jury the neuroscience evidence and explain what
they believe it means.112

1.

Brain Scans

One category of neuroscience evidence is computer images called
brain scans. These images show either how the brain functions or its
structure.113

a.

Function: Reveals the Living Brain

Functional brain scans are computer images of a person’s brain
that show how his brain works by tracking how blood flows through
the brain.114 This “allow[s] living brains to be observed, both as their
shape changes over time and as they function,” to show what part of a
person’s brain is used when they do particular tasks, such as moving,
thinking, or experiencing sensation or emotion.115 Thus, this may
show if a brain functions abnormally.116
There are a few kinds of functional brain scans. Functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) is considered the “gold standard
of behavioral neuroscientific imaging” because it produces an image
110. See Blume & Paavola, supra note 35, at 911–14.
111. See James S. Walker & William Bernet, Neuroscience & Legal Proceedings,
in THE ORIGINS OF ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOR: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE 237,
238 (Christopher R. Thomas & Kayla Pope eds., 2012); see also Blume & Paavola,
supra note 35, at 914–915.
112. See Walker & Bernet, supra note 111, at 238.
113. See Abram S. Barth, A Double-Edged Sword: The Role of Neuroimaging in
Federal Capital Sentencing, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 501, 503 (2007).
114. See Teneille Brown & Emily Murphy, Through A Scanner Darkly: Functional
Neuroimaging As Evidence of A Criminal Defendant’s Past Mental States, 62 STAN.
L. REV. 1119, 1127 (2010); Pettit, supra note 44, at 320. The premise behind
functional neuroimaging is that when a part of the brain is working, blood and sugar
will flow to that part of the brain. See ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV.,
UNDERSTANDING THE BRAIN: THE BIRTH OF A LEARNING SCIENCE 189 (2007).
Researches have relied on this premise to cure neurological diseases and perform
cognitive research. See VICTORIA SHERROW, MEDICAL IMAGING 92 (2007)
(describing the impact functional scans, including PET scans, have had in the
diagnosis and treatment of neurological diseases like Alzheimer’s).
115. Blume & Paavola, supra note 35, at 913 (citing Henry T. Greely, Neuroethics
and ELSI: Similarities and Differences, 7 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 599, 612 (2006)).
116. See id.
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with a higher resolution than any other brain scan.117 Medically,
neurosurgeons use the scans to localize tumors and track Alzheimer’s
progression.118 It can cost a few thousand dollars in addition to the
cost of an expert to both interpret it and possibly testify at trial.
Other kinds of brain scans used in courts are positron emission
tomography scans (PET)119 and single-photon emission computed
tomography scans (SPECT).120 Medically, PET and SPECT scans are
good for identifying seizures.121 One drawback from using them in
court is that the results may be manipulated, and possibly
unreliable.122 SPECT scans cost less than PET scans, but may be less
useful because the images they produce have a lower resolution.123
Another form of neuroscience evidence used in courts is the
electroencephalogram (EEG).124 Rather than producing an “image”
117. See Jean Macchiaroli Eggen & Eric J. Laury, Toward A Neuroscience Model
of Tort Law: How Functional Neuroimaging Will Transform Tort Doctrine, 13
COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 235, 239 (2012) (“[I]mage[s] generated by fMRI [are]
superior, both spatially and temporally, to the images produced by PET and SPECT
scans.”); Neal Feigenson, Brain Activity During Simulated Deception: An EventRelated Functional Magnetic Resonance Study, 15 NEUROIMAGE 727 (2002).
118. See Brown & Murphy, supra note 114, at 1127–28. For an overview of
extensive cognitive neuroscience research using fMRI, see, e.g., Feroze B. Mohamed
et al., Brain Mapping of Deception and Truth Telling About an Ecologically Valid
Situation: Functional MR Imaging and Polygraph Investigation—Initial Experience,
238 RADIOLOGY 679 (2006).
119. See Barth, supra note 113, at 503. PET scans track the metabolic rate by
injecting a radioactive substance that binds to the sugary glucose in the brain. See
THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC PUBLISHING TEXTBOOK OF NEUROPSYCHIATRY AND
BEHAVIORAL NEUROSCIENCE 772 (Stuart C. Yudofsky & Robert E. Hales eds.,
2008). It then uses an x-ray type machine to track the radioactive substance to see
where the blood and sugar flows when the patient does certain tasks. See Pettit, supra
note 44, at 320.
120. See Brickford Brown & Samuel Tarry, Does Your Pet Bite?
The
Misapplication of Brain Scans in Toxic Tort Litigation, FOR THE DEFENSE, Mar. 1997,
reprinted in CENTER FOR COGNITIVE LIBERTY & ETHICS, http://www.cognitiveliberty.
org/neuro/pet_bite.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2013). For examples of brain scans used
in courts see People v. Holt, 937 P.2d 213 (Cal. 1997), for PET scans and
Commonwealth v. Yancy, 797 N.E.2d 371 (Mass. 2003), for SPECT scans.
121. See Walker & Bernet, supra note 111, at 240–41; see also supra Part I.A.2.
122. See Walker & Bernet, supra note 111.
123. See Pettit, supra note 44, at 320.
124. See Barth, supra note 113, at 503 (citing Jessie A. Seiden, The Criminal Brain:
Frontal Lobe Dysfunction Evidence in Capital Proceedings, 16 CAP. DEF. J. 395, 402
(2004)); Snead, supra note 96, at 1290. Like the other methods, EEG is widely used
in the clinical context and in medicine to, for example, determine brain death and
communicate with the comatose. See generally 5 ATTORNEYS MEDICAL ADVISOR §
40:45 (2013); FUNDAMENTAL NEUROSCIENCE 1389 (Michael Zigmond et al. eds.,
1999); Kai Keng Ang et al., A Large Clinical Study on the Ability of Stroke Patients
to Use an EEG-Based Motor Imagery Brain-Computer Interface, CLINICAL EEG &
NEUROSCIENCE, Oct. 2011. For example, it could tell if one can become comatose or
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of the brain, like fMRI, PET, and SPECT scans, this technique
measures the brain’s electrical activity.125 Medically, this procedure
measures brains thousands of times each day to diagnose brain states
like seizures or metabolic disorders.126 Further, EEGs are often
affordable, sometimes costing merely a couple hundred dollars.127

b.

Structure: Anatomical Structure

There are also brain scans that show what the brain’s structure
looks like. One scan commonly used in hospital emergency rooms is
a computer tomography (CT) scan. A CT scan is basically a series of
x-rays that when placed together can create a 3D image.128 Thousands
of CT scans are taken each day for medical purposes.129 Medically,
CTs are particularly useful for identifying strokes and brain lesions.130
A fair market value for the scan is approximately $700 without
insurance.131
Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) has largely replaced CT scans
because it provides a far higher resolution,132 albeit at a higher cost.133

will get a seizure when under the influence of alcohol. See Berryman v. Ayers, No.
1:05 CV 05309 AWI, 2007 WL 1991049, at *15–19 (E.D. Cal. July 10, 2007) (defense
counsel’s expert argued that an EEG showed that the client could not have
committed rape without having a seizure). In addition to the scans—fMRI, PET, and
SPECT––there are a few more types of tests that can be administered that this note
will not generally address because they are not generally used in court. See Denno,
supra note 92. For example, brain fingerprinting which uses EEGs to determine if a
memory is accurate and Brain Electrical Activity Mapping (BEAM). See ZILLMER ET
AL., PRINCIPLES OF NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 43 (2nd ed. 2008) (describing BEAM scans);
Pettit, supra note 44, at 321.
125. See Snead, supra note 96, at 1282–83.
126. See Walker & Bernet, supra note 111.
127. See EEG, HEALTHCARE BLUE BOOK, http://healthcarebluebook.com/page_
Results.aspx?id=205&dataset=MD (last visited Oct. 24, 2013) (estimating the fair
market price of an EEG to be $254).
128. See Keith A. Johnson, Neuroimaging Primer, WHOLE BRAIN ATLAS, http://
www.med.harvard.edu/AANLIB/hms1.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2013).
129. See Walker & Bernet, supra note 111, at 240.
130. See id. at 239.
131. See Brain CT (With and Without Contrast), HEALTHCARE BLUE BOOK,
http://healthcarebluebook.com/page_Results.aspx?id=205&dataset=MD (last visited
Oct. 24, 2013) (estimating the fair market price of an CT scan to be $895, including
both the scan and physician interpretation).
132. See generally Silvia A. Bunge & Itamar Kahn, Cognition, Neuroimaging, in
THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NEUROSCIENCE (George Adelman & Barry H. Smith eds.,
Elsevier B.V. CD-ROM, 3d ed. 2004) (citing Snead, supra note 96, at 1281)
(explaining that the MRI had replaced the CT because it is so detailed that it possible
to differentiate gray matter from white matter with the naked eye).
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Unlike the CT, which uses x-rays, the MRI produces a detailed image
of the brain’s anatomical structure by lining up magnets on either side
of the head134 and “measuring the signal strengths of the various radio
frequencies emitted by the proton nuclei of atoms in brain tissue.”135
Medically, MRIs are particularly suited to measure brain
abnormalities such as the presence of tumors, contusions, or
dementia.136 They cost a little under $1000.137
Because each type of brain scan captures slightly different pieces of
information, neuroscientists recommend using more than one type of
brain scan on a patient, increasing the accuracy of any resulting
diagnosis.138

c.

Limitations

While brain scans may reveal brain damage or other abnormalities,
there are a number of limitations. First, because brain scans do not
speak for themselves, an expert must explain to the jury what they
mean.139 Thus, it is possible for experts to disagree or to misinterpret
the findings.140 They may also be influenced by bias, or have a motive
to mislead.141 The very fact that this risk exists may lead to prolonged
“battle of the experts” cases where each side argues for different
interpretations of a scan.142 What is worse, jurors and judges may not
realize how subjective interpretations of these scans are and may
commit errors in reasoning as a result.143 Second, a person’s brain and
his environment work together to form his behavior—the brain alone
is not determinative.144 So, for example, a fully functioning “normal”

133. See J.T. Lindsay Wilson & Peter Mathew, SPECT in Head Injury, in SPECT
IMAGING OF THE BRAIN 69, 69 (Roderick Duncan ed., 1997) (noting MRI scans are
“slower and more expensive than CT” scans).
134. See Walker & Bernet, supra note 111, at 240.
135. Snead, supra note 96, at 1281; see also Eggen & Laury, supra note 117, at 241.
136. See Walker & Bernet, supra note 111, at 240.
137. See Brain CT (With and Without Contrast), supra note 131 (estimating the
fair market price of an MRI scan to be $895, including both the scan and physician
interpretation).
138. See Moritz F. Kircher et al., A Brain Tumor Molecular Imaging Strategy
Using A New Triple-Modality MRI-Photoacoustic-Raman Nanoparticle, 18 NATURE
MED. 829 (2012).
139. See Blume & Paavola, supra note 35, at 925–30.
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. See id. at 927.
144. See Barbra Bradley Hagerty, A Neuroscientist Uncovers A Dark Secret, NPR
(June 29, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=127888976.
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person may have a brain that looks the same as a sociopath’s.145 For
instance, a brain scan revealed that a University of California-Irvine
Neuroscientist, James Fallon, has a brain that looks like a killer’s,
although there is no evidence that he is a serial killer.146 Third, a
“normal” brain scan does not in any way mean a person is free from
brain damage—there are many possible brain abnormalities that
brain scans cannot detect.147

2.

Neuroscience Evaluations

Brain disorders and abnormalities can also be detected without
using brain scans. Neuroscience evaluations are tests given by mental
health professionals.148 These tests measure psychological functions
“known to be linked to a particular brain structure or pathway.”149
Such functions include: attention and concentration; visual perception
and reasoning; memory; learning; verbal functions; academic skills;
construction; concept formation; self-regulation and motor ability;
and emotional status.150 Medically, a neuroscience evaluation is a
well-accepted tool to identify brain abnormalities such as brain
lesions.151 An evaluation costs from three to four thousand dollars,
depending on the test.152
Other examinations may include: unstructured interviews with the
defendant, his or her acquaintances, or family members; review of a
defendant’s medical, social, and academic history; and a physical
examination.153 Scholars argue neuroscience evaluations should be
conducted before any brain imaging is done because they may
provide more reliable evidence of brain abnormalities and are more
economically feasible.154
An important qualifier to remember is that all neuroscience
evidence is just that—evidence. Like all evidence, it is only one part

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

See id.
See id.
See Blume & Paavola, supra note 35, at 927.
See id. at 912.
See id. at 911.
See id. See generally BERNARD J. ALPERS & ELLIOTT L. MANCALL,

ESSENTIALS OF THE NEUROLOGICAL EXAMINATION 1–32 (4th ed. 1975) (describing
in detail the neuropsychological testing process).
151. See Walker & Bernet, supra note 111, at 244.
152. See Parent’s Guide to the Pediatric Neuropsychological Assessment, CENTER
FOR NEUROPSYCHOLOGY & COUNSELING, http://thecenterinwarrington.com/Parents
__Guide_to_NP_Eva.html (last visited May 9, 2013).
153. See ALPERS & MANCALL, supra note 150, at 1–32.
154. See Blume & Paavola, supra note 35, at 910.
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of the picture. It should be considered alongside other background
information such as the environment one grew up in or other life
experiences.155 Thus, many cases that use neuroscience evidence
admit other evidence of the defendant’s background that are
mitigating, like prior abuse.156
In sum, neuroscience evidence may enter criminal courtrooms in
many forms. It may enter through expert testimony, through the
results of a neuroscience evaluation, or even as an actual picture of
the human brain.157 Each type of neuroscience evidence has unique
advantages and disadvantages when used in criminal courtrooms. For
clarity, the remainder of this Note will collectively refer to all of these
types as “neuroscience evidence.”
D. Admissibility of Neuroscience Evidence
The admissibility of neuroscience evidence is governed by each
jurisdiction’s rules of evidence and case law.158 While the Sixth
Amendment may still require attorneys to develop neuroscience
evidence that is not admissible at trial, whether the evidence could be
admitted is a factor courts consider.159 Federal Rules of Evidence
(FRE) 702–06 and relevant state counterparts govern all scientific
evidence, including neuroscience evidence.160 Experts may also
present neuroscience evidence in court by relying on the evidence
during their testimony.
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 determines what scientific testimony
is permissible at trial and considers facts such as whether the evidence
is accepted in the relevant medical community or is otherwise highly
reliable.161 Neuroscience evidence does not always meet this test.162

155. See Hagerty, supra note 144.
156. See, e.g., Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 392 (2005) (holding that the Sixth
Amendment required the defense attorney to utilize to investigate his client’s
neurological and mental heath while crafting the defense case theory, but also ruling
that evidence of the defendant’s extremely abusive childhood should have been
admitted).
157. See, e.g., Hernandez-Alberto v. State, 889 So. 2d 721, 727 (Fla. 2004)
(admitting a neuroscience evaluation and testimony of five experts, and granting
defense attorney’s motion to admit a PET scan of the defendant’s brain in order to
determine if the defendant was competent to stand trial).
158. See Walker & Bernet, supra note 111, at 238.
159. See BRIAN R. MEANS, POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES § 35:6 (2013).
160. See Walker & Bernet, supra note 111, at 238; see also FED. R. EVID. 702–06.
161. FED. R. EVID. 702; see also FED. R. EVID. 104(a).
162. See, e.g., People v. Brooks, No. A124664, 2011 WL 5979668, at *1 (Cal. Ct.
App. Nov. 30, 2011), review denied, (Feb. 29, 2012) (finding a SPECT scan
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In People v. Hix, an expert was prepared to testify that a SPECT scan
showed the defendant suffered from a brain abnormality, namely, a
dysfunction in his frontal and temporal lobes.163 The trial court did
not allow this testimony because it determined that SPECT scans are
not accepted in the relevant medical community as a means to
diagnose brain abnormalities.164 However, this rule is not uniform.
For instance, the court in Briscoe v. Scribner allowed an expert to
testify that a SPECT scan can show the defendant suffered from a
brain abnormality.165
The Federal Rules of Evidence may also limit the conclusions
experts can reach. In federal cases, for instance, an expert is
prohibited from presenting an opinion about whether or not a
criminal defendant possesses a certain mental state if it is an element
of the crime.166 Some, but not all, states have similar prohibitions.167
When neuroscience evidence is admitted to argue the defendant
could not form intent to kill, for example, the conclusion is
inadmissible.168
Both the Federal Rules of Evidence and their state counterparts
are stricter during the guilt phase of trial than during the sentencing
phase.169 Neuroscience evidence, like many other types of scientific
inadmissible because it was not shown to be accepted in the relevant medical
community).
162. See People v. Hix, No. B203884, 2009 WL 242318, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 3,
2009)
163. See id.
164. Id. at *8. (“SPECT scans are generally accepted in the scientific community
of neurology to diagnose Alzheimer’s disease, stroke, and epilepsy, they are not
generally accepted in the scientific community to diagnose brain injuries or mental
disorders such as schizophrenia or depression. Appellant does not cite to, nor have
we found, California cases holding that SPECT scans are generally accepted to
diagnose schizophrenia or brain damage negating appellant’s intent to kill or proving
that he was insane at the time he committed the crime.”).
164. See Briscoe v. Scribner, No. CIV S-04-2175 FCD GGH P., 2010 WL 1525695,
at *52–53 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2010).
165. See id.
166. See FED. R. EVID. 704(b) (“In a criminal case, an expert witness must not state
an opinion about whether the defendant did or did not have a mental state or
condition that constitutes an element of the crime charged or of a defense.”). The
fear is that instead of aiding the jury in their decision, it will usurp the jury of their
fact-finding power. See id. (“Those matters are for the trier of fact alone.”).
167. See, e.g., MD. R. EVID. 5-704.
168. State v. Appacrombie, 766 So. 2d 771, 775–76 (La. Ct. App. 2000) (admitting
evidence of defendant lobotomy to argue she could not form intent to kill requisite
for a second degree murder charge).
169. See Pustilnik, supra note 84, at 185 (“[N]euroscience evidence primarily has
been offered by the defense in mitigation at sentencing.”). Further, in capital cases,
jurors are allowed to see all reasonably available mitigating evidence because they
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evidence, is more likely to be admitted during the sentencing phase of
trial.170 Therefore, the Sixth Amendment is more likely to require
attorneys to develop neuroscience evidence when they prepare the
sentencing argument.171
II. DELINEATED STANDARDS: WHEN THE ABA AND
STRICKLAND REQUIRE COUNSEL TO DEVELOP NEUROSCIENCE
EVIDENCE IN THEIR BACKGROUND INVESTIGATION
This Part explores when the Sixth Amendment compels attorneys
to develop neuroscience evidence. First, it addresses when Strickland
would require attorneys to develop such evidence, and then it
explains how the ABA Guidelines have expanded on Strickland.
A. The ABA Guidelines: Attorneys Must Develop Neuroscience
Evidence in Some Cases
The ABA Guidelines assert that defense counsel must investigate
if their client suffers from brain damage or other mental health
concerns.172 The Guidelines draw a strong dividing line between noncapital cases (where effective defense counsel may sometimes use
neuroscience) and capital cases (where neuroscience must always be
investigated).173
In non-capital cases, the ABA Guidelines recognize that it may be
necessary for counsel to develop neuroscience evidence.174 It states

are deciding whether this person’s crime is so wrong, is so evil, that only death can
bring justice. When making this decision, the criminal justice system believes jurors
should be given all information that may lessen the crime’s ultimate wrongfulness so
their decision will be as fully informed as possible. If a criminal defendant suffers
from brain damage, this background information might be important for the jury to
know. If they did not know, they may mistakenly believe a crime was solely caused
by a defendant’s evil wrongful character, not a mental disease.
170. See id.
171. See Appendix.
172. See ABA, supra note 48, at 1021.
173. Currently, most states require lawyers to provide legal services professionally
and ethically in line with the ABA Guidelines for capital cases. See id. at 938 (“[A]ny
jurisdiction wishing to impose a death sentence must at minimum provide
representation that comports with these Guidelines.”); accord Richard P. Mauro, The

Chilling Effect That the Threat of Sanctions Can Have on Effective Representation
in Capital Cases, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 417, 424–25 (2007). Many lower courts also
cite the ABA Guidelines when determining if counsel’s reasonable investigation
should have included neuroscience evidence. See, e.g., Summerlin v. Schriro, 427 F.3d
623, 629–30 (9th Cir. 2005).
174. See
generally
Mental
Health,
A.B.A.
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/criminal_justice_section_archive/crimjust_st
andards_mentalhealth_blk.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2013) (outlining standards
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the defense attorney’s “legal representation plan should provide for
investigatory, expert, and other services” at all phases of trial if they
are “necessary to quality legal representation.”175
Thus, if
neuroscience is necessary for a defense, counsel must seek experts to
help develop it.176
In capital cases, counsel must always investigate to see if there is
neuroscience evidence available to help their client, because brain
damage is common among capital defendants.177 As the ABA
Guidelines explain, “With respect to the guilt/innocence phase,
defense counsel must independently investigate the circumstances of
the crime and all evidence––whether testimonial, forensic, or
otherwise––purporting to inculpate the client.”178 Counsel must
“subject[] all forensic evidence to rigorous independent scrutiny,” and
“investigate and present mitigating evidence.”179 As the comments to
Guideline 4.1 explain, “Counsel must compile extensive historical
data, as well as obtain a thorough physical and neurological
examination. Diagnostic studies, neuropsychological testing,
appropriate brain scans, blood tests or genetic studies, and
consultation with additional mental health specialists may also be
necessary.”180
The Guidelines recognize that neuroscience evidence, while
potentially expensive, is absolutely necessary because it is so highly
probative in many areas of a criminal proceeding.181 The commentary
for Guideline 10.7 explains that counsel also has a duty to explore
“[m]edical history,” including “mental and physical illness or
injury . . . and neurological damage”; family history, including “family
history of mental illness, cognitive impairments”; “special educational

mental heath professionals must adhere to when testifying on behalf of a defendant,
including disclosure requirements).
175. See ABA, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE
SERVICES 5-1.4 (3d ed. 1992), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/publications/criminal_justice_standards/providing_defense_services.authche
ckdam.pdf.
176. See id.
177. See ABA, supra note 48, at 956, 959. See generally Craig Haney, The Social
Context of Capital Murder: Social Histories and the Logic of Mitigation, 35 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 547, 559–83 (1995).
178. See ABA, supra note 48, at 926.
179. Id. at 926, 1021.
180. Id. at 956 (emphasis added).
181. They recognize the importance of mental health in many stages of a
proceeding, including the initial competency, mental health when the offence
occurred, ability to form intent, understanding of Miranda warnings, and ability to
waive constitutional rights. See id.
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needs (including cognitive limitations and learning disabilities)”; and
service in the military, including “health and mental health services”
received.182
Moreover, counsel must speak with the client as soon as possible to
develop records of his or her mental health.183 Records can have “a
wealth of mitigating evidence, documenting or providing clues to
childhood abuse, retardation, brain damage, and/or mental illness.”184
Further, they must interview the defendant’s family members and
others who know the family such as neighbors and parole officers.185
It is necessary to interview non-family members in case the family
suffers from impairments similar to the client’s.186
Thus, under the ABA Guidelines approach, neuroscience evidence
should be a real part of counsel’s reasonable investigation, and,
specifically in capital cases, defense counsel may be ineffective for
failing to comply with this duty.187
B.

When the Strickland Standard Requires Attorneys to
Develop Neuroscience Evidence

The Strickland standard does not specify when neuroscience or
other mental health evidence must be developed because the
approach does not approve of “mechanical rules” regarding what is or
is not effective assistance.188 After Strickland, the U.S. Supreme
Court did not find a single attorney ineffective for over sixteen
years.189 This means the Court provided no guidance for all kinds of
evidence––not just neuroscience evidence.190 Three years after
Strickland, Justice Marshall expressed concern over how little the

182. Id. at 1022–23.
183. See generally id. at 1024–26.
184. Id. at 1024.
185. Id.
186. See id.
187. See id. at 1025.
188. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696 (1984). The Court explicitly
rejected the ABA Approach, stating that ABA Guidelines “are guides to
determining what is reasonable, but they are only guides.” Id. at 688. Relying too
much on guidelines would “interfere with the constitutionally protected
independence of counsel and restrict the wide latitude counsel must have in making
tactical decisions. Indeed, the existence of detailed guidelines for representation
could distract counsel from the overriding mission of vigorous advocacy of the
defendant’s cause.” Id. at 689.
189. See Blume & Neumann, supra note 50, at 134.
190. For further discussions on how the unclear Strickland standard leaves courts
without guidance for all kinds of evidence, see id. at 134.
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standard has done to protect the accused.191 He warned that unless
the Court put teeth into Strickland, the Court will “permit the lower
courts to conclude that the Sixth Amendment guarantees no more
than that ‘a person who happens to be a lawyer is present at trial
alongside the accused’––a notion expressly disavowed in
Strickland.”192 It took the Court thirteen years to apply Strickland
with more force, in a decision that arguably was only facially decided
under Strickland.193 During the U.S. Supreme Court’s silence, several
lower courts provided attorneys with somewhat contradictory
guidance about when the Sixth Amendment requires them to develop
neuroscience evidence.194
One common thread between the decisions, however, is that
attorneys who violated their client’s Sixth Amendment rights, often
did little to no investigation or preparation in many areas of the case.
For instance, the defendants in Glenn v. Tate and Skipper v. Lee are
quite similar.195 Both were placed into special education classes in
school, had low IQs, and had previously undergone mental health
counseling.196 Both had suffered from severe organic brain damage
since childhood.197
However, the defense attorney in Glenn failed to discover the
defendant’s organic brain damage because he did not attempt to
construct a social history of Glenn and did not interview family
members or review school records that would have revealed the brain
damage.198 Because counsel did not know of the brain damage, he did
not present it during the guilt or sentencing phases of trial.199 In
contrast, the defense attorney in Skipper did a background
investigation into the defendant’s social history, interviewed his

191. See generally Mitchell v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 1026 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(lamenting how the standard iterated in Strickland may not an adequate safeguard
for the criminally accused).
192. Id. (quoting Strickland, 446 U.S. at 685).
193. See Blume & Neumann, supra note 50, at 135.
194. For more cases finding ineffective assistance for failure to introduce
neuroscience evidence under the Strickland Standard, see, for example, Coleman v.
Mitchell, 268 F.3d 417 (6th Cir. 2001); Nobles v. Johnson, 127 F.3d 409 (5th Cir.
1997); Glenn v. Tate, 71 F.3d 1204 (6th Cir. 1995); Loyd v. Whitley, 977 F.2d 149 (5th
Cir. 1992); People v. Morgan, 719 N.E.2d 681 (Ill. 1999); and People v. Ruiz, 686
N.E.2d 574 (Ill. 1997).
195. See Skipper v. Lee, 238 F.3d 414, 415 (4th Cir. 2000); Glenn, 71 F.3d at 1208–
11.
196. See Skipper, 238 F.3d at 415; Glenn, 71 F.3d at 1208.
197. See Skipper, 238 F.3d at 415; Glenn, 71 F.3d at 1207.
198. See Glenn, 71 F.3d at 1208–11.
199. See id. at 1207.
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family members, and consequently set up a psychological evaluation
of his client and discovered the brain damage.200 While the defense
attorney in Skipper chose not to present information about his client’s
brain damage at the guilt phase, he did present it at sentencing.201 The
court found that defense counsel in Glenn violated his client’s Sixth
Amendment rights, whereas the court in Skipper determined defense
counsel provided his client with adequate representation.202
It seems clear that attorneys must do some type of background
investigation and that if they do so properly, they will likely comport
with the Sixth Amendment. But given that defense attorneys do not
have unlimited time nor the financial resources to intensely
investigate each client, and that not all defendants actually suffer
from brain damage, how thorough should the investigation be?
Unfortunately, Strickland does not provide guidance about what—
precisely—is expected. For example, does a defense attorney need to
develop neuroscience evidence in every case? If not, how can we tell
when it is or is not required?
In addition to not developing neuroscience evidence, counsel could
fail to provide adequate representation under the Constitution by
failing to prepare for trial at all. For example, the defendant in
Wallace v. Stewart brutally beat and killed his girlfriend and her three
children one-by-one as they returned home.203 The defense attorney
spent only thirty-six minutes preparing the psychological expert in the
case and he did not provide the expert with the results of a
personality test that a court appointed psychologist performed on the
defendant to determine if he was competent.204 Likewise, in Bean v.
Calderon, defense counsel knew his client suffered from organic brain
damage as well as other serious mental impairments,205 yet he failed to
give two experts who were testifying in the case the documentation
necessary for them to testify that the client suffered from brain
damage.206 As a result, the expert could not definitively conclude that

200. See Skipper, 238 F.3d at 415.
201. See id.
202. See id.; Glenn, 71 F.3d at 1205; see also Loyd v. Whitley, 977 F.2d 149, 157–58
(5th Cir. 1992) (adopting the trial courts factual determination and affirming their
decision that counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel because defense
counsel “simply failed to develop independent psychiatric evidence of mental disease
or defect in a death case where this line of investigation was clearly indicated”).
203. Wallace v. Stewart, 184 F.3d 1112, 1113 (9th Cir. 1999).
204. Id. at 1115–16.
205. Bean v. Calderon, 163 F.3d 1073, 1078 (9th Cir. 1998).
206. See id. at 1078–79. During post-conviction proceedings, one of the experts
testified that the defendant “exhibited substantial physical, mental, and emotional
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the defendant had brain damage or that he could “appreciate the
criminality of his conduct.” Instead the expert could “merely testify
that Bean suffered from an organic personality disorder and was
moderately defective in intelligence.”207
In most of these lower court cases, the attorney’s incompetence
was based on a lack of general common sense. For instance, in
Buenoano, the defense attorney merely interviewed an expert
psychologist during the lunch break before trial and did not provide
the psychologist with any mental health information,208 including
details about the defendant being physically and sexually abused
growing up as well as information about the defendant’s grandiose
delusions, such as insisting that she was working towards her PhD and
MD when she was not.209
Unfortunately, earlier lower court decisions often left mentally
impaired defendants little constitutional recourse, and gave
inadequate instruction to lawyers hoping to satisfy their Sixth
Amendment duties.210 As the ABA Guidelines explain, “Under the
standards set out by the U.S. Supreme Court for reviewing claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel, even seriously deficient performance
all too rarely leads to reversal.”211
III. CASE ANALYSIS: RECENT COURT DECISIONS (SOMETIMES)
REQUIRE A TTORNEYS TO DEVELOP NEUROSCIENCE EVIDENCE
This Part reviews results of the case study conducted by the author.
First, it explains the case analysis’ background; second, it explores
common elements between cases; and third, it reviews the results of
the case search and goes over some “red flags” attorneys should look
for to more adequately protect a criminal defendant’s Sixth
Amendment rights.

impairments that were relevant to each of the . . . sentencing factors in mitigation.”
Id. at 1079.
207. Id. at 1078.
208. See Buenoano v. Singletary, 963 F.2d 1433, 1438 (11th Cir. 1992).
209. Id. at 1037–38.
210. See Blume & Neumann, supra note 50, at 131.
211. ABA, supra note 48, at 930; see also William S. Geimer, A Decade of
Strickland’s Tin Horn: Doctrinal and Practical Undermining of the Right to Counsel,
4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 91, 94 (1995) (“Strickland has been roundly and properly
criticized for fostering tolerance of abysmal lawyering.”); Kim Taylor-Thompson,
Tuning Up Gideon’s Trumpet, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1461, 1465 (2003) (“[T]he ruling
has proved disabling to the right to effective assistance of counsel in practice.”).
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A. Case Law Analysis
Since Strickland, some U.S. Supreme Court Justices have voiced
concern over the quality of legal representation, specifically in capital
cases.212 Justice O’Connor—who wrote the majority decision in
Strickland—noted, “Perhaps it’s time to look at minimum standards
for appointed counsel in death cases.”213 These concerns have found
their way into a string of U.S. Supreme Court rulings finding defense
attorneys ineffective for not developing some type of mental health or
neuroscience evidence about their client.214
This seemingly significant change in U.S. Supreme Court
jurisprudence is further bolstered because the opinions withstood the
stringent standard of review outlined in the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), which will permit habeas
review when the lower court’s decision violated “clearly established
Federal law.”215 Thus, this group of U.S. Supreme Court opinions
assert that it is “clearly established law” that, in some cases, the Sixth
Amendment requires defense attorneys to present arguments based
on neuroscience.216
These decisions shift effective assistance
jurisprudence to a less deferential approach that treats the ABA
Guidelines as a minimum “standard of professional norms.”217

212. Justice Ginsberg noted that “people who are well represented at trial do not
get the death penalty,” and Justice O’Connor noted that the court “may well be
allowing some innocent defendants to be executed.” ABA, supra note 48, at 929
(citing Anne Gearan, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Supports Death Penalty
Moratorium, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 10, 2001).
213. Id.
214. See Sears v. Upton, 130 S. Ct. 3259 (2010); Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30
(2009); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510
(2003).
215. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012); see also Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 380; Wiggins, 539
U.S. at 520 (applying the statute).
216. See § 2254 (noting that the Court can only review a state court judgment
clashing with a clearly established law).
217. See Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 387; Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524 (“Counsel’s conduct
similarly fell short of the standards for capital defense work articulated by the [ABA]
standards to which we long have referred as ‘guides to determining what is
reasonable.’” (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 588, 688 (1984))). As the
Sixth Circuit said in a startling departure from a prior Strickland-oriented approach,
“American Bar Association standards have long been considered guides to the
reasonableness of counsel’s conduct.” Haliym v. Mitchell, 492 F.3d 680, 716–17 (6th
Cir. 2007). Many lower court cases now treat the ABA Guidelines as a standard of
“professional norms.” See, e.g., Littlejohn v. Trammell, 704 F.3d 817, 859 (10th Cir.
2013). This charge is particularly pronounced in cases where defense counsel fails to
introduce evidence about their clients based on neuroscience. See, e.g., Sinisterra v.
United States, 600 F.3d 900, 908 (8th Cir. 2010); Young v. Sirmons, 551 F.3d 942, 957
(10th Cir. 2008); Smith v. Dretke, 422 F.3d 269, 279 (5th Cir. 2005).
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Given that the Sixth Amendment sometimes requires defense
attorneys to present neuroscience evidence, the author hoped to
review case law to develop a guideline attorneys could use to ensure
compliance with the Sixth Amendment.218 Unfortunately, very few
bright line rules in current case law specify when the Sixth
Amendment requires defense attorneys to develop neuroscience
evidence. For example, in Perkins, Mr. Perkins did not want to be
evaluated by an expert, and insisted that his counsel not develop
evidence of his mental health or abuse background.219 The fact that
Mr. Perkins literally fired one of his defense attorneys for trying to
interview jail personnel about his mental heath was immaterial
because the Sixth Amendment required counsel to develop
neuroscience evidence regardless of Perkins’ wishes.220 In contrast,
the court in State v. Fautenberry, found counsel did not violate their
client’s Sixth Amendment rights when they failed to discover his
brain injury because Mr. Fautenberry said he did not want to meet
with a psychologist to be evaluated.221
B.

Results: Common Characteristics

These decisions spurred courts across the nation to hold that the
Sixth Amendment may require effective counsel to develop
neuroscience evidence of their client in capital cases.222 These cases
do not follow the Strickland or ABA Guideline standards, but rather
follow a kind of quasi-ABA approach.223
Many of these decisions have much in common with Perkins. First,
like Mr. Perkins, the defendant is often charged with first-degree
murder. In all five U.S. Supreme Court cases, and in seventy of the
seventy-four lower court cases identified, the client was charged with
first-degree murder. Second, a jury eventually sentenced Mr. Perkins
to death.224 In all U.S. Supreme Court cases and the vast majority of

218. See Appendix for cases and descriptions.
219. See supra Introduction.
220. See supra Introduction.
221. See State v. Fautenberry, No. C-971017, 1998 WL 906395, at *4 (Ohio Ct.
App. Dec. 31, 1998).
222. See Appendix for example cases.
223. No court has held, as the ABA Guidelines provide, that neuroscience must be
used in all capital cases. These recent developments retain Strickland’s “strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance.” JOSEPH R. SIMPSON, NEUROIMAGING IN FORENSIC
PSYCHIATRY: FROM THE CLINIC TO THE COURTROOM 269 (2012).
224. See Perkins v. Hall, 708 S.E.2d 335, 338 (2011); see also supra Part I for
further discussion of Mr. Perkins’s case.
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lower court cases analyzed, the client was eventually given the death
penalty.
Third, the neuroscience evidence could have been used in many
different stages of the case. In Perkins, neuroscience evidence—
evidence of his brain injury—could have been useful during the
competency, guilt, and sentencing phases of his trial. Like Perkins, in
these cases counsel should have developed evidence for many stages
of a criminal trial, although the most common stage was during the
sentencing phase. Lastly, Mr. Perkins suffered not only from brain
injury, but also from prior physical and sexual abuse.225 Many cases
where the Sixth Amendment requires counsel to develop
neuroscience evidence also require defense attorneys to investigate
other kinds of evidence—like evidence of an abusive childhood.
C.

Results: Duty to Investigate Red Flags

The Sixth Amendment is the basis for an attorney’s independent
duty to take specific affirmative steps to determine if their client
suffers from brain damage.226 For instance, in Correll v. Ryan,
defense counsel’s investigation consisted of open-endedly asking the
defendant and his family to provide him with any information that
would help with the defense.227 He did not ask for any specific
information about the client’s “drug abuse, head injury, psychiatric
history, or family dysfunction.”228 The Ninth Circuit found that
ineffective assistance of counsel “resulted from counsel’s complete
failure to ask any relevant questions”––interviewing witness and
reading records alone, without asking pointed, specific questions
aimed at uncovering red flags was not sufficient.229 Likewise, in
Ferrell v. Hall, counsel only asked about “statutory mitigation
factors,” and neglected to follow-up on any information that did not

225. As the introduction of this Note explains, Mr. Perkins was physically abused
by his father and sexually assaulted by a neighbor when he was a child. See Perkins,
708 S.E.2d at 342; supra Part I. Like many courts, the Georgia Supreme Court in
Perkins also asserted that the defense attorneys should have also explored evidence
of this abuse. See Perkins, 708 S.E.2d at 343–44.
226. See, e.g., Caro v. Woodford, 280 F.3d 1247, 1250, 1254–55 (9th Cir. 2002)
(finding counsel ineffective when he knew defendant, the son of a farmer, had an
“extraordinary history of exposure to pesticides and toxic chemicals, yet he neither
investigated fully this history nor informed the experts who examined Caro of those
facts that were known to him”).
227. 539 F.3d 938, 945 (9th Cir. 2008).
228. Id. at 945.
229. Id.
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portray the defendant in a positive light.230 This investigation was
found unreasonable because it failed to uncover a wealth of
information, including that the capital defendant had a very low IQ,
suffered from hallucinations since he was a child, and had organic
brain dysfunction in his frontal lobe.231
However, there are some factors, or “red flags,” that should put a
reasonable attorney on notice that neuroscience evidence may need
to be developed. A red flag is some factor, such as a head injury or
serious substance abuse, which may indicate brain damage, a brain
abnormality, or another mental impairment. Case law shows that
failure to obtain neuroscience evidence is most likely to raise a red
flag if it is one of many errors or oversights counsel has made.232
D. Red Flags
Below are some “red flags” that commonly give rise to a duty for
counsel to investigate further for neuroscience evidence.

1.
233

Head Injury

234

State
and federal
criminal courts, of all levels––the U.S.
Supreme Court,235 federal circuit courts,236 and state county courts––

230. 640 F.3d 1199, 1216 (11th Cir. 2011).
231. Id. at 1211–13. One of the experts said that if he had been given information
about the defendant’s head injury and hallucinations, he would have recommended
further neuroscience evaluation. See id. at 1220. Indeed, testing done for postconviction proceedings revealed the defendant suffered from “frontal lobe
dysfunction,” and “temporal lobe epilepsy” attributable to his head injury. Id. at
1213. The expert “explained that individuals with frontal lobe dysfunction display
impaired insight and learning abilities, are more prone to impulsive and explosive
behaviors, and are more prone towards affective instability, meaning a dysfunctional
emotional or mental state.” Id. at 1213. Again, a jury gave the defendant a death
sentence without knowing any of this highly important mitigation evidence. See id. at
1199.
232. See SIMPSON, supra note 223, at 269.
233. See, e.g., Coleman v. State, 64 So. 3d 1210, 1218 (Fla. 2011).
234. See, e.g., Stallings v. Bagley, 561 F. Supp. 2d 821, 877 (N.D. Ohio 2008)
(finding ineffective assistance when counsel failed to follow up even though they
knew their client suffered a head injury as a child); see also Loyd v. Whitley, 977 F.2d
149, 156 (5th Cir. 1992).
235. See, e.g., Sears v. Upton, 130 S. Ct. 3259, 3261 (2010) (finding defense counsel
ineffective for failing to follow up despite knowledge that their client suffered
significant damage to his frontal lobe as a child).
236. All circuit courts have also treated prior head injury as a red flag counsel must
inquire about, and once known, must investigate further for brain abnormalities. See,
e.g., Sinisterra v. United States, 600 F.3d 900, 905, 907 (8th Cir. 2010) (finding
ineffective assistance when counsel knew defendant suffered head injury but did not
follow up with further testing when further testing may have uncovered that
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have found that head injury is highly indicative of neurological
damage and have deemed counsel ineffective for not investigating
possible brain abnormalities.237 For instance, the defendant in
Frierson suffered a serious head injury that resulted in four days of
hospitalization and impaired vision for over two years.238 Although
his defense attorney consulted medical records and knew of the
accident, he did not consult with a neurologist about the effects of the
defendant’s head trauma—had he done so, he would have discovered
that the defendant’s low IQ was due to the fall.239
Although learning of a client’s prior head injury may give an
attorney a duty to investigate further, attorneys may have an
independent duty to develop evidence of a head injury.240 Such
evidence of head injury may be obtained through interviews with
their client, his family, or by surveying pertinent records.241 For
example, in Blystone v. Horn, defense counsel was ineffective
because he did not develop and review records from when the client

defendant likely suffered from brain damage); Frierson v. Woodford, 463 F.3d 982,
990 (9th Cir. 2006) (ineffective when counsel failed to investigate when defendant’s
school records revealed he suffered head injury and, consequently, had a low IQ);
Pizzuto v. Arave, 385 F.3d 1247 (9th Cir. 2004) (Fletcher, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (finding ineffective assistance when defense counsel knew
defendant “sustained serious head injuries from falling down a flight of stairs at the
age of two and from a bicycle accident when he was a teenager” and failed to inform
psychiatric expert testifying in the case); Caro v. Woodford, 280 F.3d 1247, 1251, 1256
(9th Cir. 2002) (finding counsel ineffective for failing to follow up despite that their
was likely “brain damage caused by head injury, exposure to toxic pesticides and the
combination of both factors”).
237. See Richard E. Redding, The Brain-Disordered Defendant: Neuroscience and
Legal Insanity in the Twenty-First Century, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 51, 58 (2006) (“[E]ven
mild head injuries can cause frontal lobe damage.”); see also Appendix for a list of
forty-five cases where counsel was found ineffective for failing to investigate when
they either knew their client suffered a traumatic head injury or would have learned
by doing a proper investigation.
238. See Frierson, 463 F.3d at 990.
239. See id.
240. See, e.g., Blystone v. Horn, 664 F.3d 397, 422 (3d Cir. 2011).
241. For example, in Turpin v. Lipham, a capital case, defense counsel did curate
2500 pages of records about the defendant to the jury to collect mitigation evidence
even though “[t]rial counsel knew they had a client who had been institutionalized in
mental hospitals, children’s homes, and treatment centers for nine years.” 510 S.E.2d
32, 41–42 (Ga. 1998). A reasonable investigation would have uncovered evidence
that the defendant “had been subjected to, or diagnosed with, chronic poverty,
physical abuse, alcoholic parents, severe neglect, isolation from his family, severe
behavioral problems, conduct disorders, anxiety disorders, a possible learning
disability, inadequate socialization, head injuries, and a wide disparity between his
performance IQ and his verbal IQ.” Id. Without this information, a blinded jury
sentenced him to death. See id.
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was incarcerated in Maryland and was enlisted in the Navy.242 A
review of these records would have revealed that the defendant
suffered from a head injury at age four that, according to one of the
defense experts, caused the defendant brain damage.243 Likewise, in
State v. Pearce, a capital case, defense counsel did a minimal
investigation for mitigating information––he never even contacted
any of the defendant’s family members.244 The court found counsel
ineffective because if he had contacted family members, it would have
uncovered a wealth of mitigating information including that Pearce
“fell down the stairs as a baby, received head injuries when he fell out
of a truck, and was diagnosed with dyslexia that he possibly received
from a brain injury.”245

2.

Low Intellectual Functioning

Courts have also found that low intellectual functioning indicates
the kind of brain damage that effective counsel must develop as part
of a reasonable investigation.246 Counsel may also have a duty to
determine a client’s IQ, specifically if it is contained in the
defendant’s records.247 For example, in Hamblin v. Mitchell, counsel’s
investigation was considered unreasonable because he failed to
review school records that would have revealed this capital defendant
was not educated above the seventh grade and had a low IQ.248 It was
immaterial that the resulting investigation did not reveal cognitive
impairment because counsel’s duty was only to investigate.249 Low
intellectual functioning as a red flag may manifest in a poor academic

242. 664 F.3d at 422.
243. See id. at 407 n.5.
244. 994 So. 2d 1094, 1100–01 (Fla. 2008).
245. Id. at 1101–02.
246. See, e.g., Goodwin v. Johnson, 632 F.3d 301, 322 (6th Cir. 2011) (holding that
an investigation that did not reveal the defendant had an IQ of seventy-three was
unreasonable); see also Hernandez v. Martel, 824 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1059 (C.D. Cal.
2011) (noting low intellectual function may be an “indicator[] that petitioner is
neuropsychiatrically impaired”).
247. See Goodwin, 632 F.3d at 321–22 (concluding counsel’s investigation was
unreasonable because counsel failed to review the defendant’s “education records
includ[ing] a psychological report prepared in January 1989, when Goodwin was
fourteen. The report indicated that Goodwin had an IQ of seventy-three”).
248. Hamblin v. Mitchell, 354 F.3d 482, 490 (6th Cir. 2003).
249. See id. at 492.
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history, such as failing or repeating grades,250 history of special
education,251 or a low IQ.252

3.

Serious Substance Abuse

Serious substance or alcohol abuse may exacerbate existing brain
abnormalities.253 This is especially true when the defendant began
using the drug at a young age and the substance correlates highly with
brain damage, such as crack cocaine use.254 Further, parental or other
family members’ use of drugs or alcohol may indicate possible brain
damage in the defendant, such as those who suffered from fetal
alcohol syndrome.255 This red flag in particular is likely associated
with other social factors that could be specifically mitigating. For
example, often if a defendant is a drug addict and their parents were
250. See Hernandez, 824 F. Supp. 2d at 1059 (finding ineffective assistance when
counsel failed to investigate despite client’s “rather rock-bottom scholastic
performance starting at first grade”).
251. See, e.g., Simmons v. State, 105 So. 3d 475, 508 (Fla. 2012), reh’g denied, (Jan.
7, 2013) (finding an unreasonable investigation when “trial counsel had available
material showing that Simmons had low intelligence, was in special education and
classes for the emotionally handicapped in school, dropped out of school early, and
suffered the loss of oxygen to his brain as a toddler” but failed to investigate further);
see also Smith v. Mullin, 379 F.3d 919, 942–44 (10th Cir. 2004) (finding ineffective
assistance of trial counsel after counsel failed to investigate client’s background and
present mitigating evidence of mental impairment, traumatic background, and brain
injury––the fact that defendant attended special education classes in high school
should have lead counsel to investigate further).
252. See, e.g., Hurst v. State, 18 So. 3d 975, 1009 (Fla. 2009) (finding an
unreasonable investigation when counsel did not investigate further, including
reading “records [that] would have shown that Hurst had a low IQ, was in special
education classes, and dropped out of school after repeating tenth grade”).
253. See Redding, supra note 237, at 58 (“Substance abuse, relatively common
among those who sustain traumatic brain injury, exacerbates the degree of brain
damage.”); see also Harold V. Hall, Criminal-Forensic Neuropsychology of Disorders
of Executive Functions, in DISORDERS OF EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONS: CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL LAW APPLICATIONS 37, 65 (Harold V. Hall & Robert J. Sbordone eds.,
1998).
254. See, e.g., Walker v. State, 88 So. 3d 128, 138–39 (Fla. 2012) (finding counsel
ineffective for not investigating defendant’s history of serious substance abuse. The
evidence was extremely mitigating given that the defendant was using drugs daily at
eleven years old with his family, and used crack cocaine and LSD—highly damaging
illicit substances). But see Smith v. Quarterman, 515 F.3d 392, 404–05 (5th Cir. 2008)
(rejecting argument that “mere knowledge of his prolonged substance abuse should
have prompted trial counsel to evaluate his cognitive functions and test for organic
brain damage”).
255. See, e.g., Hurst, 18 So. 3d at 1008, 1011 (Fla. 2009) (finding that defense
counsel’s investigation was unreasonable because he failed to present evidence of
defendant’s “organic brain damage based on fetal alcohol syndrome”—highly
mitigating evidence that “could have provided the jury with a basis to recommend
life”).
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as well, he may have grown up a victim of other related sexual or
physical abuse, and thus had associated traumatic childhood
experiences.256 For example, a history of homelessness may be
associated with both childhood drug abuse and childhood neglect—all
of which may be highly mitigating to a jury, especially in death
penalty cases.257
Not only can substance abuse cause brain damage, but it may also
be a form of self-medication for people with mental impairments.258
As such, under the quasi-ABA standard, a reasonable investigation
may require counsel to investigate further if a client suffers from
serious substance abuse.

4.

Childhood Abuse

Prior childhood abuse can also be a strong mitigating factor for a
jury to consider and is all too common among criminal defendants.259
Severe physical or sexual abuse may help explain to a jury why the
client committed the crime, specifically if the facts of abuse are
similar to the charged offense. For example, in Rompilla v. Beard,260
the capital defendant’s “father locked [him] and his brother Richard
in a small wire mesh dog pen that was filthy and excrement filled . . . .
They had no indoor plumbing in the house, he slept in the attic with
no heat, and the children were not given clothes.”261 Counsel were
ineffective because they did not present the jury with any of this
mitigating information when the court sentenced him to death.262
The U.S. Supreme Court ultimately found counsel violated his client’s
Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel, and reversed.263

256. See, e.g., Coleman v. State, 64 So. 3d 1210, 1218 (Fla. 2011) (finding
ineffective assistance when counsel failed to uncover the client’s serious substance
abuse. Defendant also had a poor relationship with his father, and was subjected to
physical and sexual abuse as a child).
257. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Martel, 824 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1048 (C.D. Cal. 2011)
(finding the counsel’s investigation unreasonable when they failed to discover that at
the time of the offense the defendant was “homeless, isolated from his family, drug
addicted and living in a van”).
258. See, e.g., Correll v. Ryan, 539 F.3d 938, 952 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Correll began
experimenting with alcohol and drugs around age ten. He was using marijuana, LSD,
and amphetamines regularly by age twelve, behavior that can be characterized as
self-medication for the everyday trauma of his life and for the mental health illnesses
that were later diagnosed when he became a ward of the state.” (emphasis added)).
259. See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 390–92 (2005).
260. Id.
261. Id. at 392.
262. Id. at 393.
263. Id. at 376.

216

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLI

IV. PROPOSED FRAMEWORK: A “REASONABLE INVESTIGATION”
SHOULD INCLUDE INVESTIGATING A DEFENDANT’S MENTAL
HEALTH B ACKGROUND, AND, IF NECESSARY, DEVELOPING
NEUROSCIENCE EVIDENCE
This Part first advocates for a model that will guide attorneys in
determining when the Sixth Amendment compels them to develop
neuroscience evidence. It then proposes a framework attorneys can
follow to determine––at a minimum––if their performance may not be
in line with the Sixth Amendment. This framework is further
developed by applying it to Mr. Perkins’ case, which aims to show
that if his attorneys had followed the proposed framework, they might
not have violated Mr. Perkins’ Sixth Amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel.264
A. Attorneys Need More Specific Instructions to Determine if
Neuroscience Evidence is Required
There is a practical and legal need for clear standards that
attorneys can follow to ensure they are in line with the Sixth
Amendment while still giving their clients the effective representation
they are entitled to.265
This need is especially strong when
neuroscience evidence is required because many attorneys may not
have a working understanding of neuroscience. While it may be
counterintuitive for an attorney to seek out a client’s brain scan, for
example, to provide effective assistance under the Sixth Amendment,
this act may be necessary.266 Consequently, no matter how unfamiliar
or counterintuitive neuroscience may be, it is a real part of a client’s
background and may need to be explored as part of a reasonable
investigation.267
Current sources of legal authority––such as the ABA Guidelines,
the U.S. Supreme Court, and other case law––neither clearly explains
when lawyers must develop neuroscience evidence nor describes what
evidence must be developed.268 The following framework aims to
expand on these sources, specifically the ABA Guidelines, in order to

264. See Perkins v. Hall, 708 S.E.2d 335, 342–44 (Ga. 2011); see also supra notes 1–
10 and accompanying text (providing background information about David Aaron
Perkins).
265. See supra Part II.B.
266. See supra Part II.
267. See supra Part II.
268. See supra Parts II, III and accompanying notes (explaining the differing
standards used by the ABA, relevant Supreme Court cases, and lower court
decisions).
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further instruct attorneys about when the Sixth Amendment does or
does not require the development of neuroscience evidence.
B.

Proposed Framework to Satisfy Sixth Amendment
Requirements

This Note’s proposed framework consists of three parts. First,
criminal defense attorneys should conduct an initial interview;
second, they should do a thorough background investigation; and
third, they should take further action if certain red flags are
uncovered through either their interview, background investigation,
or other sources.269 The type of crime the client is charged with and
the stage in the legal proceeding may also influence this analysis.

1.

Initial Interview

When taking on a new client, an attorney must conduct interviews
with the client and the client’s family, friends, and acquaintances.
During these interviews, counsel should attempt to determine the
client’s current and past mental health.
During the client interview, counsel should ask, at a minimum,
whether the client himself or anyone in the client’s family suffers from
or has been treated for mental illness. Counsel may also want to have
the client fill out a questionnaire to determine the presence of any red
flags possibly indicating mental illness, namely, prior head injury, low
intellectual functioning, serious substance abuse, or past abuse.270
Depending on the circumstances, counsel may also want to
investigate other factors, such as toxin exposure and what
medications the client is taking.271 Effective counsel should use this
interview to determine other possible sources of information by
asking what schools the client attended, if the client has ever been
incarcerated, and whether the client interacted with social service or
mental health agencies.
After interviewing the client, counsel should also interview family,
friends, and acquaintances. In Perkins, for example, the Georgia

269. See supra Parts III.C, III.D.
270. See id. (further discussing red flags and how they may give rise to a duty for
counsel to investigate further, at least in capital cases).
271. See, e.g., Caro v. Woodford, 280 F.3d 1247, 1255 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding
ineffective assistance of counsel in a capital case when counsel failed to investigate
further or inform experts when they knew criminal defendant grew up on a farm and
had a history “exposure to pesticides and toxic chemicals”—if they has investigated,
they would have discovered defendant suffered from organic brain damage in part
caused by this exposure).
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Supreme Court found that Mr. Perkins’ attorneys were ineffective
because they only interviewed his mother and ex-wife, and did not
interview any of his other friends, family, or acquaintances.272 If they
had conducted additional interviews, counsel would have learned that
the defendant suffered from severe personality changes after a head
injury.273
Using this approach is a simple, effective way attorneys can search
for red flags that will help guide them to determine where else they
should look. Opponents may argue that this interview approach is
not ideal because it may lessen the independence of trial counsel,
which may hinder their zealous advocacy. However, this interview is
simply a “minimal” standard, so it still remains perfectly permissible
for counsel to do more than a mere interview. Further, counsel
already conducts client interviews, so this deeper probing interview
would not drastically change how defense counsel represents their
client.
Second, opponents may argue that—for some clients—asking
about mental health may upset the client and ruin the attorney-client
rapport. This is the argument the defense attorney gave in Perkins
when the court found he had violated his Sixth Amendment rights.274
At the end of the day, if there is mitigating information that would
help with the defense, it is the defense attorney’s duty to try their best
to find it—even if it offends the client. Nevertheless, questions to
help determine if there are any red flags may be asked in a nonoffensive matter if they are routinely made at an initial interview with
a client.
Third, opponents may argue it is unreasonable to expect attorneys
to do so much. This is exactly why the recommendations take into
account the type of case and stage in the proceeding. Defending a
capital murder case—which is where the Sixth Amendment usually
requires this evidence—is, of course, going to require more than
defending a misdemeanor case.

2.

Background Investigation

As the ABA Guidelines state, a “legal representation plan should
provide for investigatory, expert, and other services” at all phases of

272. See Perkins v. Hall, 708 S.E.2d 335, 340–41 (Ga. 2011); see also supra notes 1–
5 and accompanying text.
273. See Perkins, 708 S.E.2d at 343–44.
274. See supra Introduction.
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trial if they are “necessary to quality legal representation.”275 Thus,
counsel should not rely solely on the client’s initial interview. The
court in Perkins also found the attorneys ineffective because they
failed to acquire medical records of the rake accident.276 Attorneys
should try to acquire all reasonably available records, such as school
records, medical records, the case file from prior incarceration,
criminal history, facts surrounding a defendant’s prior crimes, social
service records, and prior psychological evaluations. This includes all
records the attorney has learned of through their prior interviews or
from other sources. When attorneys get the records, they must also
read them. In Perkins, the medical records would have revealed that
a rake actually penetrated Mr. Perkins’ brain.277

3.

Follow-Up if Red Flags Are Detected

If a defense attorney has uncovered a red flag—a warning sign that
their client may suffer from some neurological impairment—he or she
may want to consider two things to help determine the next step.
First, counsel may want to consider how neuroscience could influence
a possible defense. For example, if the accused is charged with
premeditated murder, then neuroscience evidence could assist in a
self-defense claim. However, if the charge is negligent homicide,
neuroscience evidence may not be as probative. Second, the
defendant’s attorney may want to consider how serious the red flag is.
The red flag is serious in a case like Perkins, where prongs of a rake
literally penetrated the accused’s brain and other evidence of brain
damage existed.278 The red flag is less serious if the client had a sports
concussion as a teenager and has shown no other effects, although
this may, in conjunction with other factors, be important in some
cases.
In cases like Perkins, where competency, mental state, and
mitigation in sentencing could make a difference, neuroscience
evidence may be part of a valid defense. In capital cases like Perkins,
most mental health information could fit into a valid defense because
it could be a mitigating factor during sentencing. However, for less
serious cases such as assault, neuroscience evidence may not be as
vital for a defense.

275.
276.
277.
278.

See ABA, supra note 63.
See supra notes 1–10 and accompanying text.
See supra Introduction.
See supra Introduction.
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If it could fit into a valid defense, the attorney should try to
determine how likely it is that the defendant suffers from brain
damage. The more serious the red flags, the greater the duty to
thoroughly investigate. In Perkins, for example, if counsel had
interviewed Mr. Perkins’ family, friends, and associates—as this
framework recommends—counsel would have learned Mr. Perkins
suffered from head injury, serious sexual and physical abuse as a
child, and substance abuse beginning at a young age—all indicators of
brain injury.279 If an investigation reveals such red flags, especially if
there is more than one, the client should be sent to a mental health
professional for an examination. During this examination, the mental
health professional should look for possible brain damage by
conducting an IQ test or a neuroscience examination on the client.280
The mental health professional may also recommend brain scans to
determine the extent of the brain damage. This will both help ensure
an informed diagnosis, and also help counsel understand the damage
so that they can demonstrate such to a jury.281
By following these steps, the minimum requirements of the Sixth
Amendment should be satisfied. The attorney will have investigated
the case enough to make an “informed choice among possible
defenses.”282 This is not to say that these steps will necessarily be
enough to satisfy the Sixth Amendment in all cases, but rather, based
on the U.S. Supreme Court standards, ABA Guidelines, and case law,
this level of investigation will meet at least the minimum level of
effective counsel.
CONCLUSION
Given the important interests at stake, analyzing whether or not a
criminal defendant had a fair trial with effective assistance of counsel
should not be left to a “reasonableness” standard that gives no clear
guidance to courts or attorneys. The importance of the fundamental
right to have criminal defendants effectively represented is too
important to our adversarial system. A brain injury or abnormality
may be a real part of a criminal defendant’s background that would
inform an attorney about the appropriate defense to pursue and, if
such an injury exists, it may be too important for a defense attorney

279. See Perkins v. Hall, 708 S.E.2d 335, 342 (Ga. 2011).
280. See supra Part I.C.1c. As noted in Part I.C.2, these tests measure
psychological functions, such as attention and verbal function, and may indicate if
there is a brain abnormality.
281. See supra Part 1.C.
282. See supra Part 1.A.
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to let the technical and scientific nature of neuroscience evidence get
in the way. Attorneys must be aware of the obligations the ABA,
U.S. Supreme Court, and other court cases have laid out to ensure
they are effective advocates who strive to protect their clients’ civil
liberties and fundamental right to a fair trial.
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APPENDIX
Criminal Cases Finding Counsel Ineffective for Failing to
Develop Neuroscience Evidence
April 1992 to March 2013

U.S. Supreme Court Decisions
2010

Sears v. Upton, 130 S. Ct. 3259 (2010)

2009

Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30 (2009)

2005

Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005)

2003

Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003)

2000

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000)

Lower Federal and State Court Decisions
2013




Littlejohn v. Trammell, 704 F.3d 817 (10th Cir. 2013)
Lacy v. State, 2013 Ark. 34, 2013 WL 460432

2012



James v. Ryan, 679 F.3d 780 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated, 133
S. Ct. 1579
Lynch v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 897 F. Supp. 2d 1277
(M.D. Fla. 2012)
Simmons v. State, 105 So. 3d 475 (Fla. 2012)



2011

2010









Blystone v. Horn, 664 F.3d 397 (3d Cir. 2011)
Ferrell v. Hall, 640 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. 2011)
Goodwin v. Johnson, 632 F.3d 301 (6th Cir. 2011)
Hernandez v. Martel, 824 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (C.D. Cal.
2011)
Winston v. Kelly, 784 F. Supp. 2d 623 (W.D. Va. 2011)
Coleman v. State, 64 So. 3d 1210 (Fla. 2011)
Perkins v. Hall, 708 S.E.2d 335 (Ga. 2011)



Detrich v. Ryan, 619 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2010)
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2009




Sinisterra v. United States, 600 F.3d 900 (8th Cir. 2010)
Deere v. Cullen, 713 F. Supp. 2d 1011 (C.D. Cal. 2010),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 718 F.3d 1124










Johnson v. Mitchell, 585 F.3d 923 (6th Cir. 2009)
Libberton v. Ryan, 583 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 2009)
Jones v. Ryan, 583 F.3d 626 (9th Cir. 2009)
Scott v. Schriro, 567 F.3d 573 (9th Cir. 2009)
Richards v. Quarterman, 566 F.3d 553 (5th Cir. 2009)
Hummel v. Rosemeyer, 564 F.3d 290 (3d Cir. 2009)
Pierce v. Thaler, 355 F. App’x 784 (5th Cir. 2009)
Wesbrook v. Quarterman, 318 F. App’x 265 (5th Cir.
2009)
Stankewitz v. Wong, 659 F. Supp. 2d 1103 (E.D. Cal.
2009), aff'd, 698 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2012)
Hurst v. State, 18 So. 3d 975 (Fla. 2009)
State v. Cooper, 979 A.2d 792 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div.
2009)
State v. Barber, 206 P.3d 1223 (Utah Ct. App. 2009)





2008
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Correll v. Ryan, 539 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. 2008)
Stallings v. Bagley, 561 F. Supp. 2d 821 (N.D. Ohio 2008)
United States ex rel. Harris v. McCann, 558 F. Supp. 2d
826 (N.D. Ill. 2008)
State v. Pearce, 994 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. 2008)

2007






Morales v. Mitchell, 507 F.3d 916 (6th Cir. 2007)
Haliym v. Mitchell, 492 F.3d 680 (6th Cir. 2007)
Anderson v. Sirmons, 476 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir. 2007)
Gilley v. Morrow, 246 F. App’x 519 (9th Cir. 2007)

2006





Frierson v. Woodford, 463 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2006)
Poindexter v. Mitchell, 454 F.3d 564 (6th Cir. 2006)
Blackwood v. State, 946 So. 2d 960 (Fla. 2006)

2005




Daniels v. Woodford, 428 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2005)
Earp v. Stokes, 423 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2005), opinion
suspended and amended on denial of reh’g, 431 F.3d
1158
Smith v. Dretke, 422 F.3d 269 (5th Cir. 2005)
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2004




Smith v. Mullin, 379 F.3d 919 (10th Cir. 2004)
State v. Duncan, 894 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 2004)

2003






Hamblin v. Mitchell, 354 F.3d 482 (6th Cir. 2003)
Frazier v. Huffman, 343 F.3d 780 (6th Cir. 2003).
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